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Sandesh Dhungana
During recessions, fiscal, monetary and other credit provision policies are used to-
gether to combat falling consumption levels and stabilize output. Most such counter-
cyclical stabilization policies are deemed effective when households use provided credit
or cash towards raising consumption. Hence, a deep understanding of consumer finance
is central to understanding how and when such counter-cyclical stabilization policies
work, and when they do not. In my dissertation, I focus primarily on one set of stabi-
lization policies; namely fiscal stimulus. I provide particular empirical and theoretical
insight into how consumers manage their finances and in particular liquidity levels, and
how this behavior is connected to the effectiveness of fiscal policy during balance sheet
recessions. I also discuss how the definition of effectiveness itself may need to undergo
some revisions as applied to a balance sheet recession.
Chapter 1 “Heterogeneity in effectiveness of fiscal stimulus: The Economic Stimulus
Payments of 2008" empirically investigates regional heterogeneity in the effectiveness of
fiscal rebates during recessions characterized by housing crises. While general estimates
of the effectiveness have been measured in previous literature, the state dependence of
such effectiveness to the particular type of business cycle state (for example depth of
regional housing crisis) is unknown. I first provide a description of the 2008 recession,
and the history of recent fiscal policies along with the institutional arrangement of the
fiscal stimulus policies enacted during the time. I next review the relevant empirical
literature on fiscal policy effectiveness. I then describe the empirical methodology to
estimate the effectiveness of fiscal rebate policies in 2008 and their regional heterogeneity.
Using a special module of the Nielsen Consumer Panel which surveys households about
their 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments, I show that households’ marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) out of these rebates was significantly lower in zipcodes with larger
declines in housing prices. This pattern holds for both households with liquid assets and
for those without. This highlights a novel finding compared to the previous literature;
fiscal policy effectiveness is not explained solely by the behavior of households without
liquid assets. These findings are not caused by differences in socio-economic and other
observable characteristics and are robust to the use of a topology based instrument for
housing price changes. Finally, I show that the results are driven by the difference in
reported vs. revealed preference for reported savers and deleveragers in the hardest hit
areas.
Chapter 2 “Policy and Theoretical Implications of Regional Heterogeneity in Fiscal
Stimulus Effectiveness" investigates how the findings in Chapter 1 square with policy
implications and consumption theory. On the policy side, I discuss how this result cre-
ates a policy dilemma, where fiscal stimulus may have been least effective in stimulating
nondurable consumption in precisely the regions experiencing the worst recession. This
underscores potential tradeoffs between the utilitarian and aggregate demand stabiliza-
tion motives for rebate provision and the need to add nuance to the definition of fiscal
policy effectiveness. On the theory side, I revisit the theoretical consumption literature
and describe its predictions for MPC in a time of lower incomes and wealth. In particular,
I look at how the negative relation between MPC and house price decline is at odds with
the predictions of canonical buffer-stock models, which predict a higher MPC in worse
affected regions. Next, I build a state of the art heterogeneous agent life cycle model,
which features adjustment costs, long term debt and a default option, and calibrate it to
regional variation in housing price declines, unemployment risk and income declines. I
discuss newer mechanisms which could potentially match the empirical results. In real-
ity, I show that even such a model substantially overestimates the effectiveness of fiscal
stimulus in the worst affected regions. I explore the reasons behind such a mismatch,
including the lack of marginal deleveraging in the model. Finally, I use data from the
Michigan Survey of Consumers to rule out regional variation in permanent expectations
as a key variable which could reconcile the findings in the data. Overall, the findings
remain unreconciled with standard consumption theory, even after the augmentation of
modern and realistic elements.
Chapter 3 “Evolution of Hand to Mouth Households (2007-09) and Lessons" con-
tinues on the theme of household liquidity which has been analyzed significantly to
understand fiscal policy. A key parameter in the previous literature has been the pro-
portion of illiquid households with housing wealth (also called wealthy hand to mouth
households) who are important in understanding fiscal policy effectiveness. Two sepa-
rate strands of the literature have emphasized either the role of permanent characteristics
or income and wealth shocks (circumstance) in determining such status. In light of this,
I document three new and robust findings. First, the overall proportion of such wealthy
hand to mouth households stayed constant during the early years of the Great Recession.
Second, there was massive underlying movement between various groups underneath
the overall numbers. Third, households who built liquidity buffers had significantly
larger losses to housing wealth and smaller losses to permanent income expectations.
They also achieved this improvement in liquidity through methods other than the ex-
traction of illiquid assets. This implies households who build liquidity buffers during
housing crisis recessions do so through cutting consumption sharply. Taken together,
these findings imply a) that both circumstantial and characteristics views on household
liquidity are important, and b) that consumption models with net illiquid assets cannot
match central facts for balance sheet recessions. This is because they predict households
building liquidity buffers through extraction of illiquid wealth, which is unavailable dur-
ing such recessions. In contrast, models with asset valuation effects do a better job of
matching the liquidity management decisions of households.
The goal of my research is to inform debates on fiscal policy effectiveness and the
linkages to household liquidity. Future recessions with limitations on conventional mon-
etary policy will especially be important times when these debates will play out. I hope
this research provides useful information in the design and analysis of future counter-
cyclical fiscal policies.
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Heterogeneity in effectiveness of fiscal stimulus: The Economic
Stimulus Payments of 2008
1
1.1 Introduction
The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of fiscal stimulus payments during
recessions is important for understanding both the determinants of consumption and
the effectiveness of fiscal policy.2 A large empirical literature has estimated a quarterly
MPC for nondurables out of fiscal rebates of between 0.2 to 0.35 (Johnson et al. (2006),
Johnson et al. (2013)). Beginning with Mian et al. (2013), there has also been significant
interest in studying how housing wealth shocks led to higher consumption in the 2003-
06 housing boom and then lower consumption during the 2007-2009 recession. We
know little, however, about how such declines in wealth affect the MPC out of fiscal
rebates. Much of the theoretical literature predicts that fiscal rebates are more effective
at stimulating consumption in a housing crisis, as households face tighter borrowing
1Calculated (or Derived) based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing
databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth
School of Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researchers and do
not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in
analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
2Fiscal rebates are a key part of the fiscal stimulus policy toolkit and accounted for $100 billion of
spending during the Stimulus Act of 2008. Oh and Reis (2012) document that three quarters of the
increase in U.S. government expenditures during the 2007-2009 recession were accounted for increases in
transfers, rather than government purchases.
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constraints and lower net worth, increasing their propensity to consume. Yet in practice,
there is widespread concern that in a housing crisis, overleveraged households will use
stimulus checks to pay down debt, rather than increase consumption.
Understanding the empirical relation between the MPC out of transitory income and
declines in housing wealth is important for two reasons. First, this is a moment which
can be used to test a key prediction of existing consumption models, namely that the
MPC should be higher when wealth is lower. Second, since the primary goal of fiscal
stimulus programs is to raise aggregate consumption during recessions, the MPC out
of rebates is a key determinant of these policies’ effectiveness. Understanding how
the MPC relates to declines in wealth informs policymakers about when these policies
will be effective at the aggregate level, and how they can be best targeted to stimulate
spending.
In this chapter, I empirically study regional heterogeneity in the effectiveness of fiscal
rebates during recessions characterized by housing crises. I construct a unique dataset by
combining Zillow housing price data, the Nielsen Consumer Panel and a supplemental
Economic Stimulus Payments survey. The U.S. Treasury scheduled tax rebate payments
based on the last two digits of individual Social Security Numbers, which are effectively
random. Following the recent literature, I exploit the randomized timing of rebates to
estimate the effect of stimulus receipt on household expenditures. The primary result is
that the average MPC was lower in zipcodes where housing prices declined more sharply.
In particular, households in the bottom third of the housing price decline distribution
had a marginal propensity to consume close to zero. This pattern remains when I use
housing supply elasticity (Saiz (2010)) as an instrument for house price changes. The
result is also robust to controlling for demographic differences between zipcodes and
winsorizing the data. The negative correlation between regional housing wealth declines
and average MPC exists both among households with substantial liquid assets, and for
those with lower levels of liquid wealth. This finding is novel, as recent literature on
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MPC has primarily emphasized the role of households without liquid assets. Finally,
I show that the difference in average MPC is driven by the variation in difference in
reported vs. revealed behavior of self-reported savers/deleveragers in the hardest hit
zip codes.
Related Literature This chapter is connected to several strands of the literature. The
first, a body of empirical papers, highlights the propensity of households to spend a
significant proportion of their rebate checks in nondurables. Using the 2001 Consumer
Expenditure Survey, Johnson et al. (2006) show households on average spent between 20
to 40% of their tax rebate checks in the quarter of receipt. Agarwal et al. (2007) affirm
these findings. In a subsequent study, Johnson et al. (2013) show households on average
spent between 20 and 30% of their 2008 stimulus checks on nondurables in the quarter
of receipt. Broda and Parker (2014) find similar MPC for 2008 rebate checks in their
analysis of Nielsen weekly spending data. In all of these studies, authors use random
variation in rebate payments distribution to control for selection effects and address
endogeneity concerns. In addition, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) use the University of
Michigan Survey of Consumers to affirm an average MPC of 33% in 2008. This literature
establishes an important fact; the quarterly average MPC for nondurables out of stimulus
checks is between 20 and 35%.
Concurrently, a related line of research has emphasized the role of household het-
erogeneity in spending responses to fiscal rebates. In their analysis, Broda and Parker
(2014) ask respondents if they have sufficient liquidity to cover two months of income.
Households who respond ‘Yes’ have close to zero spending responses to rebates, while
households who do not have sufficient liquidity have significantly higher consumption
responses. Misra and Surico (2014) find almost 50% of households did not increase con-
sumption after receiving rebates in 2001 or 2008, and around 20% spent a significant
amount, with MPC over 50%. They find MPC is heterogeneous across households based
on liquidity status and debt. They also find MPC distribution across income is bi-modal.
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Poor households and wealthier households with more debt and less liquidity have high
MPC, while middle income households have the lowest MPC.
Traditional consumption theory has had difficulty in matching these facts. The ra-
tional expectations life cycle model with one risk free asset (Deaton (1991)) implies only
net worth constrained households spend large amounts out of transitory income shocks.
However, the proportion of households who are net worth constrained is too small
(around 8-10% of population in United States) to match the empirical results. In light of
this, more recent work by Kaplan and Violante (2014) uses the tradeoff between return
and liquidity to generate a group of wealthier but financially constrained households;
those who have parked their wealth in illiquid assets such as houses. The presence
of these households with higher MPC (around 15 to 20% of the US population3) helps
match the average MPC. Moreover, this newer model can match the bi-modal correlation
of MPC with income, as illiquid households, both poor and wealthier, have higher MPC.
In an influential series of papers, Mian and Sufi (2011) and Mian et al. (2013) show
significant response of consumption to positive housing wealth shocks in 2002-06 and to
negative housing wealth shocks in 2008-2010. Households in zip codes with large hous-
ing wealth increases raised their consumption during the housing boom. During the
recession, these households cut their consumption by more. This research has revived
interest in the role of housing wealth in consumption. Since then, both empirical and
theoretical research has argued housing wealth shocks were the key factor in affecting
consumption in the boom and bust periods.
However, there is no consensus on the efficacy of fiscal policy transfers during re-
cessions with large housing wealth falls. Most of the theoretical literature predicts that
fiscal transfers are effective at stimulating consumption in recessions with large wealth
falls for two reasons. First, as households face tighter borrowing constraints as they
go into negative equity on their houses, their propensity to consume increases. This
3 Kaplan and Violante (2014) use the Survey of Consumer Finances to measure the proportion of hand
to mouth households with illiquid assets and find close to 15% of households fall under this category.
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logic is familiar from the borrowing constraints literature such as Deaton (1991). Sec-
ond, the buffer stock theory of life cycle saving in Carroll and Kimball (1996) stipulates
consumption as a concave function of wealth due to the precautionary savings motive.
When wealth falls, MPC increases. Yet in practice, there is a concern that in a housing
crisis, overleveraged households will use their stimulus checks to pay down debt, rather
than increasing consumption. Sahm et al. (2015) show that during the payroll tax holiday
of 2011, a significant proportion of households (35% of the sample) mostly used the in-
crease in income to improve their balance sheets instead of spending. Sahm et al. (2015)
consider them “balance sheet households”, i.e. those whose consumption responses to
transitory income changes mimic permanent income hypothesis consumers even though
they are anything but. Regions where house prices declined significantly in 2008-10 also
had more households with larger negative balance sheets. If more households used the
rebates for balance sheet repair, aggregate MPC would be lower in these areas. I am
unaware of any prior research that analyzes whether balance sheet repair affected MPC
out of fiscal stimulus and if this outweighs these two channels.
In addition, this chapter is connected to research evaluating the regional variation in
effectiveness of government policies during the 2008 recession. Beraja et al. (2017) find
QE1 elicited much higher refinancing and consumption responses from households in
less depressed regions of the country. They argue that variations in housing equity made
it easy for households in less depressed areas to refinance, thus helping them smooth
consumption. The authors also claim that monetary policy actually exacerbated con-
sumption inequality rather than decreasing it. Given that the stated goal of stabilization
policies (whether monetary or fiscal) is to help households in areas hardest hit by the
recession, this result is important for future policy considerations. Unlike Beraja et al.
(2017), I study regional variation in effectiveness of fiscal policy, but the possible lessons
are similar.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the recent
5
history of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Section 3 discusses the Great Recession and the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which this chapter studies. Section 4 discusses the data
and empirical work, including the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Recent History of Counter-cyclical Fiscal Policy
Since John Maynard Keynes’ seminal contributions, counter-cyclical fiscal policy has
been recognized as a potential tool for governments to stabilize output during recessions.
The pendulum swung away from fiscal policy in the past three decades before the Great
Recession, as the policy and academic consensus shifted towards using monetary policy
as the key lever in managing business cycles. This reflected doubts on the expertise of
fiscal policymakers, the relative insulation of monetary policy from political constraints
and theoretical doubts about timeliness and effectiveness of fiscal policy. As Blinder
(2016) notes, the primacy of monetary policy as the tool for macroeconomic stabilization
was shared by a consensus of economists and policymakers.
Even with this consensus, fiscal policy has been used extensively even before the
Great Recession. There are three groups of tools in the counter-cyclical fiscal policy
toolbox. The first are automatic stabilizers. As the tax system is progressive, tax receipts
go down when incomes fall and unemployment rises during recessions. On the other
side, unemployment benefits, food stamps and other transfers rise during recessions.
Without any discretionary government action, these elements work to offset fluctuations
in output by spending more when output is below trend and vice versa. Ever since the
current tax system was set up in 1913, automatic stabilizers have been an important part
of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the United States and remain so. The other two tools
are discretionary changes to government spending and discretionary changes to taxes.
The first among these, discretionary government spending had been largely disregarded
before the Great Recession. Instead, the focus has been on the third tool, discretionary
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changes to taxes.
In 1992, facing a recession, George H.W. Bush lowered tax withholding rates with the
goal of increasing consumption and stabilizing output. Similarly, Bill Clinton proposed
a fiscal stimulus package in 1993 mixing both government spending and tax cuts but was
thwarted by Congress. In 2001, George Bush passed a $1.35 billion cut in taxes, which
was a mix of stabilization policy and long term tax cuts. This included the provision of
fiscal rebates (between $300-$600 per household) between July and September 2001. The
2001 fiscal stimulus policy has been studied extensively (Johnson et al. (2006), Misra and
Surico (2014)) and was found to have been effective in stimulating consumption.
Since the Great Recession, limits to monetary policy have became more obvious and
the discussion on discretionary fiscal policy has been reignited. As the federal funds rate
hit the zero lower bound, the conventional channel of monetary policy became harder
to implement. While the Federal Reserve engaged in unconventional monetary policy
in the form of quantitative easing, commentators saw discretionary fiscal policy as a
key tool to complement monetary policy. As Blinder (2016) argues, the crowding-out
costs of fiscal policy would be minimal in a world with zero interest rates, and the fiscal
burden placed by such policy would be lower due to the low borrowing costs for the
government.
In addition, some economists have questioned even the time-worn view that fiscal
stimulus policies would not affect the long term potential output of the economy. De-
Long and Summers (2012) argue that if a deep recession lowers future potential output
through effects on productivity or labor force skill deterioration4 , then expansionary
fiscal policy can have permanent and larger effects on output. Such possibilities make
it even more pertinent to engage in expansionary fiscal policy during large downturns
like the Great Recession.
Policymakers indeed took note, as both George Bush and Barack Obama passed two
4See DeLong and Summers (2012) on the detailed implications of such hysterersis.
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fiscal stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009. The first, the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008,
was passed in January 2008. It included measures such as tax breaks for equipment
purchases by businesses, payments to disabled veterans and some senior citizens, along
with tax rebate provision to 130 million US households. In February, the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of February 2009 (ARRA) was passed. This was a much
larger stimulus package of $787 billion, which included $288 billion in tax cuts to house-
holds and firms, $275 billion in extra unemployment and other benefits and $275 billion
in contracts, loans and grants. Of these various policies, I study the Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008.
1.3 The Great Recession and the Economic Stimulus Act
of 2008
The Great Recession of 2007-09 was the deepest recession since the Great Depression
of the 1930s. Between December 2007, when the recession started and June 2009 5, the
unemployment rate had increased from 5% to 10%. Real GDP fell by 4.3% between peak
and trough, and total personal consumption expenditures fell by 2.49%. This period was
also characterized by large losses to household and corporate wealth, as house prices fell
around 30% on average between mid-2006 to mid-2009 and the S&P 500 index fell by
57% between October 2007 and March 2009. Finally, net worth of households and non
profit organizations fell by 20% between 2007 and 2009.
Unlike other recessions in recent history, the Great Recession was unique, as it in-
volved the housing sector so prominently. As house prices declined severely during
the recession, significant proportions of American households were underwater on their
mortgages (as of 3Q 2009, 4.5 million homeowners)6. This led a large number of house-
5 The recession technically ended in June 2009 as per NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee, but
the negative effects lingered for multiple years
6http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/business/03walk.html?pagewanted=all
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holds to default on their mortgage (lenders filed 3.8 million foreclosures in 2010, which
was 23% increase compared to 2008 according to Realtytrac). Those who were not in
foreclosure often were delinquent on their mortgage payments, as the number of house-
holds missing at least one payment went up to 5 million by 2009.7 There were fears the
recession would become as deep and painful as the Great Depression.
As the recession was strengthening in 2008, the Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) was
passed by United States Congress in January 2008 and signed by President George W.
Bush on February 13, 2008 as a “booster shot” for the American economy entering a
recession.8 The most significant part of the Act was the provision of tax rebates to most
American households. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disbursed $100 billion in re-
bate checks to over 130 million households. Payments ranged from $300-$600 for singles,
$600-$1200 for couples plus $300 in child credit per child.9 The payments were provided
to households with annual income above $3,000 and were phased out for households
with incomes above $150,000 (for couples and $75,000 for individuals).10
As worries about the financial system were rising, the authorities attempted to dis-
tribute the rebate payments as soon as possible. Distribution of the rebates started in
mid May and ended by the end of July. Rebates were either sent through direct deposit
or through mail, based on whether households had provided the IRS with direct deposit
bank account numbers. Figure 1.1 shows the weeks of rebate receipt by method in the
sample. Households signed up to direct deposit received their checks mostly in May,




9 The payments equaled the households’ net tax liability.
10 If gross income was higher than $75,000 for individuals and $150,000 for couples, the payments were
lowered by five percent of the gap between the gross income and the thresholds.
11 The rebate distribution happened after Bear Stearns had been bought out by JP Morgan in March
and before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.
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Effective randomization of the rebate disbursement process makes this policy episode
attractive for research. Due to administrative difficulties, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) used the last two digits of the family head’s social security numbers to disburse the
rebates. Since these digits are assigned effectively randomly, the receipt date for rebates
is also random. Such randomization in the variation in rebate receipt allows for causal
estimation of MPC.
1.4 Data, Empirical Strategy and Results
1.4.1 Data
To document how the MPC out of tax rebates is correlated with local house price de-
clines, one requires a dataset that includes three characteristics. The first is high fre-
quency spending data from a large, representative sample of United States households.
We also need information on when and how these households learned about and re-
ceived their tax rebates. Finally, to study how the MPC is related to local house price
declines, we need data on local housing price changes. I thus combine i) weekly spend-
ing data from the Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel (NCP), ii) a supplemental Nielsen
10
survey that records dates when households received fiscal stimulus rebates in 2008 and
iii) housing market data from Zillow Inc.12
The NCP is a weekly panel dataset following 60,000 U.S. households uniquely suited
to the needs. NCP data is high frequency, as respondent households scan their expen-
ditures through barcodes when they purchase goods from stores. These purchases are
recorded daily and then aggregated to weekly spending data. Hence, the NCP suffers
much less from memory bias compared to traditional surveys such as the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). The size of the panel (over 5 times as many respondents as
the CEX) improves statistical power. Geographic coverage of the NCP data extends to
49 states across the United States. Nielsen attempts to create a balanced sample by us-
ing stratified sampling based on demographic variables such as household size, income,
race, education and occupation. In addition, NCP provides survey weights, making the
data projectable to the US population. Finally, the dataset records demographic vari-
ables such as household size, income, age, presence and age of children, employment,
education, marital status, occupation and race. These variables allow me to check for
sample balance and control for demographic characteristics.
One significant disadvantage of the data is that NCP does not include all consump-
tion goods. It includes household goods and services purchased on trips made to stores.
The spending is mostly concentrated in grocery, drugstore and mass-merchandise sec-
tors. Food, alcohol, drug products, health and beauty products, small appliances and
electronic goods are covered. The data does not cover spending on apparel, vehicles,
housing and health services. The coverage of the NCP only includes around 35% of
all nondurable goods from the CEX. My results are thus scaled to ensure the correct
interpretation.13
12 The data employed in this study is a combination of data licensed from Nielsen and data available
through the Kilts-Nielsen Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
The Kilts-Nielsen data are available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/nielsen/
13 I discuss scaling issues and goods coverage in the Section A of the Appendix.
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Following Broda and Parker (2014), I combine the NCP with the 2008 Economic Stim-
ulus Supplementary Survey (run by Nielsen with Broda and Parker (2014)) which sur-
veyed NCP recipients on fiscal rebates. Respondents were asked whether they received
stimulus checks in 2008, when they learnt about the checks, when they received them
and the amounts. The survey also records the receipt method, whether direct deposit or
mail. Questions on liquidity status and financial planning help understand households’
response to the rebate checks. Similar to Broda and Parker (2014), I drop households
who do not report receipt of the rebates or report receiving the rebate beyond the rea-
sonable time frame.
Finally, I include data on local housing market conditions from Zillow in order to
proxy changes in household housing wealth with local housing price changes. I use
Zillow’s House Price Index14 to construct a measure of these changes. Zillow’s data is
nonproprietary and yet tracks the Case-Shiller indices very well. It also has very good
coverage across zipcodes in the United States. Combining all three datasets leaves me
with weekly spending and rebate receipt data on 17,000 households for all 52 weeks in
2008 alongside data on local (zipcode level) housing prices.
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy and Results
The empirical strategy uses randomized variation in rebate receipt. I use this to un-
derstand how the estimated MPC varies with local house price declines. Significant
variation in housing price changes is important for the validity of this exercise. Fig-
ure A.4 in the Appendix shows the distribution of housing price changes in zipcodes
between December 2005 (the peak of the housing market boom) and May 2008 (when
the first rebates were sent). Housing price changes range from a fall of 60% to a rise of
40%. Next, I show the differences in MPC across regions through subsample analysis
and polynomial regressions.
14 I use Zillow’s Home Value Index (ZHVI) for All Homes (SFR, Condo/Co-op) Time Series.
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1.4.2.1 Subsample Results
The baseline regressions are specified to allow estimation of the dynamic causal im-
pact of rebates on weekly household spending in the NCP. I follow Broda and Parker
(2014) in using a distributed lag model as in equation (1). I include household and time
fixed effects to control for aggregate time specific factors and time invariant personal
characteristics.




βt−kREBi,t−k + λm,t + ei,t (1.1)
where Ci,t is the weekly spending by households in the NCP, µi denote household
fixed effects and λm,t denote weekly time fixed effects by method of rebate receipt. In
the baseline regressions I set λm,t = λt. I also separate the time fixed effects by method
of receipt for robustness checks. The regressions use the maximum possible lags (35
lags) for rebate receipt and one lead as well. REBi,t is an indicator variable for rebate
receipt that takes the value of 1 if the household i received a rebate check in week t− k.
I only use the indicator variable and not the amount of the rebate, as the rebate amount
is based on personal characteristics that are not random, hence the possibility of omitted
variable bias.
Households raise their NCP spending significantly in the first four weeks after rebate
receipt. Figure 1.2 shows the impulse response function from the week of receipt to the
next seven weeks, alongside the confidence bands at the 95% level. Rebate coefficients for
the first two weeks are positive and statistically significant, showing strong consumption
responses to rebates. Households raise average spending on NCP-measured household
goods in the week of receipt by roughly 14 dollars, 12 dollars in the week after. The
total cumulative spending in the first four weeks of receipt is higher by 38 dollars and
significant at the 5% level. The average marginal propensity to consume NCP goods
for the first month is 4.23% of average rebate size. The Nielsen Consumer Panel (NCP)
only covers around 35% of nondurable consumption in the CEX. In order to make these
13
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results comparable to CEX estimates, I scale the MPC by multiplying the estimate of
MPC for NCP goods by 100/35. Doing this exercise, the average MPC for nondurables
in the month of receipt is 12.1%, which is in line with results found by Broda and Parker
(2014).
Relative to the previous literature, I focus on MPC heterogeneity by asking the fol-
lowing question: does the average MPC vary by local housing market conditions? To get an
initial answer to this question, I split the sample into three different geographic sub-
samples. Each sub-sample groups together households in zipcodes where the housing
price changes fell into various terciles of the distribution. Figure 1.3 below shows the
cutoffs for each tercile. The lowest tercile covers areas where local housing prices had
fallen by 9% to 60%. These are the areas that were most severely hit by the housing
crisis.
In each sub-sample, I estimate equation 1 separately. This formulation allows the
comparison of spending responses within each area between households who had re-
ceived rebates with those who had not. Next, I sum up the rebate coefficients for the
first four weeks after rebate receipt, and scale the cumulative response into MPC by
14
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multiplying it by the scaling factor and dividing by the average size of the rebate in the
tercile.15 Finally, I show the cumulative first four weeks’ MPC (in percent) in Figure 1.4
along with 95% confidence bars.
The MPC out of fiscal rebates in the lowest tercile is significantly lower than the MPC
for the two higher terciles. In the lowest tercile, average household spent 7 dollars out
of their rebates in the first four week of receipt. In contrast, the average household in
the top two terciles spent 51 and 52 dollars out of their rebates in the first four weeks of
receipt, both significant at the 5% level. Scaling the estimates, the first month spending
response is rebates is 2.21% in the lowest tercile, and between 15-16% in the second
and third tercile. The gap between the lowest and the other two terciles is statistically
significant as well. Running equality of coefficients tests rejects the null hypothesis of
no difference between the coefficients at 1% level.
Figure A.5 in the Appendix shows spending responses in the following four weeks of
rebate receipt (2nd month). None of the spending responses are statistically significant,
15 Average rebate amounts in the terciles are very similar, the maximum at $920 and minimum at $890.
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Figure 1.4: Month 1 MPC by Housing Price Change
Terciles of % Housing Price Change
but the response in the lowest tercile is again much lower than those in the first two
terciles. Table A.3 shows the detailed regression results for the full sample and the three
terciles.
1.4.2.2 Polynomial Specification
While the subsample analysis gives a flavor of the differences in MPC between areas
with large housing price falls and areas without, I am interested in the full correlation
between changes in local housing prices and average MPC. In order to measure this, I
use the whole sample and run a polynomial regression using a cubic function of the
percentage change in housing prices interacted with rebate receipt lags. I choose the
cubic form to allow for nonlinear relationships. The regression specification allows the
time fixed effects to be different based on the cubic function of zip code level housing
price changes, as in equation (2). ∆H is the percentage change in housing prices in the
zip code of household i according to Zillow’s data. Predicted coefficients at each level
16
of ∆H along with 95% confidence bands are shown in Figure 1.5. Standard errors are
clustered at the zip code level.
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The full sample regression provides similar results to the subsample graphs, while
adding a few important nuances. Figure 1.5 shows the strong upward sloping correla-
tion between spending responses and local housing price changes after including all the
polynomial effects. Spending responses fall as housing prices decline more. Figure A.6
in the Appendix shows the spending response for the second month as well. The re-
sponses again show a positive slope. Detailed results of the polynomial regression are
shown in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Additionally, I test cumulative coefficients for level
and linear effect of ∆H.
Hypothesis 1. H0 : ∑3k=0 βt−k = 0
17
The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis at 1% level; (p-value = 0.0000). In zipcodes
with a zero housing price change, the spending coefficient is 41 dollars, which scales to
a MPC of 12.7%.
Hypothesis 2. H0 : ∑3k=0 ηt−k = 0
Similarly, I also reject the null hypothesis of zero linear effect of ∆H (p-value =
0.0116). A one percentage point increase in the local housing prices change variable
(from -10% to -9% for example) is associated with a 1.8 dollar increase in first month
NCP spending responses out of the rebates, which is an increase in MPC of 0.6 percent-
age points.
1.4.2.3 Liquidity Status and Robustness Checks
Recent literature has emphasized household liquidity status as a crucial parameter in
explaining MPC heterogeneity. Lack of liquid wealth signals borrowing constraints and
hence high MPC.16 Kaplan and Violante (2014)’s model of fiscal rebate responses rests
significantly on hand to mouth households who have little liquid wealth. Such house-
holds have much larger MPC than non hand to mouth households. Behavioral models
such as Angeletos (2001) also predict hyperbolic discounter households have low liquid
assets as a commitment mechanism and high MPC out of rebates. Empirically, Broda
and Parker (2014) find the quarterly MPC of illiquid households in quarter of receipt is
32.1%, significantly higher than 13.5% for liquid households.
Is the negative relationship between MPC and local house price declines driven by
the behavior of liquid or illiquid households? To answer this question, I utilize the
following question in the dataset: In case of an unexpected decline in income or increase
in expenses, do you have at least two months of income available in cash, bank accounts, or
easily accessible funds? Households answering yes (no) to the question are deemed liquid
16 Lack of liquid wealth does not always imply borrowing constraints. For individuals with low in-
comes and low but stable expectations of permanent income, a small level of liquid assets is enough as a
optimum buffer.
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(illiquid) households. In equation (3), the polynomial specification is allowed to vary
for liquid and illiquid households, including time fixed effects. If liquidity status is
a persistent characteristic, separate time fixed effects can control for the difference in
persistent spending differences between the liquid and illiquid household groups.17 LIQ
is a dummy variable used to denote households with liquid assets.
Ci,t = µi + λm,t + λm,t × ∆H+ λm,t × ∆H2 + λm,t × ∆H3+


































τt−k∆H3 × REBi,t−k × LIQi + ei,t (1.3)
These regressions re-affirm a prior result and establish a new one. Figure 1.6 shows
spending responses for illiquid and liquid households. Illiquid households always spend
more out of their rebates compared to liquid households. This affirms results from prior
studies such as Broda and Parker (2014). In addition, I find the negative correlation
between housing wealth declines and average MPC across most of the distribution come
from both liquid and illiquid households.18
F-tests for the linear slope are rejected at the 10% level for both the liquid and illiquid
households groups; Illiquid Households:(p-value = 0.089), Liquid Households:(p-value
= 0.062).
17 A recent literature discusses whether people hold low levels of liquidity because of personal charac-
teristics such as impatience or due to circumstances such as unanticipated shocks to wealth or income. For
a discussion on this circumstance vs. characteristics views of liquidity status and effect on MPC, Gelman
(2016) provides a good summary.
18 Figures A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix show Figure 1.6 with confidence intervals.
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There are three interesting parts to this result. First, research has recently focused
on illiquid households as the key group for explaining MPCs out of transitory income
shocks such as rebates. The results are however not driven by one group or another, but
are general across both groups. Any underlying cause that only affected illiquid house-
holds was not the reason for the downward sloping relationship. Second, Figure 1.6 also
shows the nonmonotonicity at the lower end of the housing price distribution comes
primarily from illiquid households, as the results for liquid households show much
less nonmonotonicity.19 Finally, the aggregate pattern is not driven by variation in the
proportion of liquid and illiquid households. Using the actual proportions of liquid
households at each ∆H bin and using the mean proportion for the full sample gives the
same pattern, as shown in Figure A.10 in the Appendix.
The main result is also general across other dimensions such as income and age. In
order to understand if this pattern is similar for poorer and richer households, I create a
19Why do households with illiquid assets have higher MPC in areas with large housing price declines?
I explore this in Subsection .2 of the Appendix.
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binary variable separating households with 2006 incomes above $70,000 from those be-
low. Figure A.11 in the Appendix shows poorer and richer groups have similar patterns
in their predicted coefficients from the regression. Both groups display the negatively
sloped pattern with local housing price declines. As expected, poorer households always
have higher MPC compared to richer households. Next, I split the data by the age of the
household head, separating older and younger households.20 Figure A.12 displays the
downward sloping pattern for both older and younger households, even as the pattern
is much more striking for younger households. In addition, younger households dis-
play a more striking nonmonotonicity as the illiquid and young categories have higher
correlation.
As a robustness check, I winsorize the data by cutting the top 0.1% of spending.
Figure A.13 in the Appendix shows the results remain the same. I also run the baseline
regressions in 10 subsamples which include deciles of the housing price change distri-
bution. Figure A.14 in the Appendix affirms the basic results of the parametric regres-
sions. Finally, I add the following control variables to the polynomial regression; high
income status, Hispanic and Black dummies, college education dummy and household
size. Each of these variables are interacted with the leads and lags of the rebate receipt
variable, which controls for dynamic effects of these characteristics on MPC. Figure 1.7
shows that the general result is robust to the addition of household covariates.
20 I take the maximum of the age of the male and female heads of households, and categorize based
on whether this age variable is above or below 55 years.
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Figure 1.7: Regressions with Controls
% Housing Price Change
1.4.2.4 Instrumental Variable Regressions and Sample Balance
Multiple factors can cause the negative correlation between local housing price shocks
and average MPC. Imagine a world where housing prices around the country are shocked
randomly. Such exogenous fall in housing prices would lower households’ wealth and
push a proportion of households to underwater status on their mortgages differentially
across the country. This would also affect the budget constraints of these households and
force some of them to be more credit constrained than others. Finally, differential shocks
22
to housing wealth would also push households in different areas differentially towards
defaulting on their mortgages, or paying back their debt and deleveraging. All of these
changes can affect the marginal propensity to consume out of rebates. I call these the
“housing net worth" channel. Importantly, if the housing shocks are large enough, they
will also amplify through effects on local economic activity. Mian and Sufi (2014) show
this was the case in the Great Recession, as areas with larger fall in housing net worth
also experienced larger falls in non-tradable employment. Hence, the housing net worth
channel includes direct effects on MPC and indirect effects through effects on the local
economy.
A separate issue is if a different shock created the differential downturn across areas,
affecting both housing prices and MPC. Recent research has often attempted to guard
against this concern by using an instrumental variable approach. A topography based
housing supply elasticity variable created by Saiz (2010) has been used extensively as an
instrument for measuring exogenous variation in the boom and bust cycle of housing
prices between 2002-2009. Areas with inelastic housing supply due to terrain respond
much more through prices when housing demand goes up, compared to areas with
elastic housing supply where it is easier to build. Importantly, if a third factor is affecting
both housing prices and MPC, it is not clear why counties with more or less elastic
housing supply would be shocked more or less by an income or employment shocks
that are uncorrelated to the housing market. Mian et al. (2013) make this point in their
analysis of the impact of housing wealth shocks on consumption.
The housing supply elasticity instrument measures random variation in housing
prices in the boom years, but is not exogenous for the 2006-09 period. As counties
with inelastic housing supplies saw larger increases in housing prices between 2002 and
2005, households also took more debt and had higher leverage than in elastic counties.
As of 2006, low elasticity areas were different from high elasticity areas in other ways
aside from the level of house prices as they had higher LTVs. As seen in Figure A.16,
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areas that had large booms in housing prices in 2002-05 also had large busts in housing
prices in 2005-08. This means that the usage of the housing supply elasticity instrument
provides exogenous variation in the full boom-bust cycle. In essence, using the instru-
ment allows the researcher to compare how the MPC differed between areas which did
not go through the boom-bust cycle and those that did.
I use the housing supply elasticity as an instrument for changes in housing prices
and estimate equation (2) as a 2SLS regression. If the empirical results are all coming
from a third factor that caused both the lower MPC and higher drops in local housing
prices, and is exogenous to the instrument, then one should see a very different pattern
in the 2SLS regressions. In the first stage, I get a F-statistic of 44, meeting the strong
instrument criteria as specified by Stock and Yogo (2002). Figure 1.8 shows that both i)
the first month MPC out of rebates through the housing price change variable predicted
by the instrument (along with the 95% confidence bands) and ii) the first month MPC in
the OLS regressions from Section 4.2.2 for comparison. It is worth remembering that the
instrument only predicts a subset of the actual ∆H variable, hence the IV results cut off
at these ends rather than at the full extremes of the ∆H distribution.
Figure 1.8 shows that the upward sloping relationship between local housing market
price changes and average MPC remains true in the 2SLS regressions. Compared to the
OLS regressions, MPC in the 2SLS regressions are slightly larger (although not statis-
tically different) and the slopes are very similar.21 This suggests that larger boom-bust
cycles in local house prices caused certain regions to have lower MPC out of rebates.
I can rule out differences in local conditions unrelated to the boom-bust cycle which
caused both a fall in house prices and low MPC. These include, for example, depen-
dence on the construction sector.
Finally, I turn attention to a separate channel that may cause an endogeneity prob-
lem. The baseline regressions include time and household fixed effects. The worry is
21As the instrument is at the MSA level, the regressions lose power, and standard error bands are larger.
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the following: are there certain household characteristics which push households to live
in housing boom/bust zipcodes? If these characteristics also change their spending pat-
terns throughout the sample, household fixed effects will control for such characteristics.
However, if the characteristics do not influence spending on average, but affect MPC out
of a rebate, household fixed effects cannot control for such factors. While I am not aware
of any such factor, I check the sample balance across covariates. Figures 1.9 and 1.10
show i) 20 bins of mean levels of covariates along with ii) quadratic fits after regressing
the covariate on ∆H through a bin scatter plot. The key covariates used are household
income in 2006, household size, age of the oldest head of the family, liquidity status,
black and hispanic status, average weekly spending, and work status.
On most dimensions, there are no large differences across the distribution of ∆H.
The subsamples are also balanced on other statistics, such as the timing of receipts, the
method of receipt and average rebate amounts. To provide more detailed information,
I also show mean covariate levels across deciles of the ∆H distribution. These statistics
are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix and affirm these results.
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The only covariate with large differences is ethnicity. The concentration of the hous-
ing crisis in particular states explains racial differences across the subsamples. Cali-
fornia, Florida , Arizona and Nevada constitute the states with the largest average fall
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in housing prices during this period. The same states also have the largest proportion
of Hispanic populations in the nation. Figure A.17 in the Appendix shows all of the
counties in the Nielsen dataset by which decile of the ∆H distribution they belong to.
Crucially, counties in various deciles are spread out instead of being clustered in one
state, hence the results are not being driven by one state.
1.4.3 Reported vs. Revealed Preference
Parker and Souleles (2017) discuss the difference between reported preferences in sur-
veys and revealed preference in actual human behavior. They also show that households
who said they mostly spent their ESA payments spent twice as much in reality com-
pared to other households. Is it possible that households who wanted to and tried to
save/deleverage did so much more strictly in harder hit areas? Were the proportions
of such savers/deleveragers higher in those areas? In order to understand if these dif-
ferences account for the regional heterogeneity in MPC, I utilize a question on what
the households were using the rebates for. Available answers to this question included;
“Mostly to increase spending", “Mostly to increase saving", “Mostly to pay off debt"
and “Not sure/don’t know". I look at the geographical heterogeneity across spenders
(those who use the rebate to mostly increase spending) and savers/deleveragers (those
who use the rebate to mostly pay down debt or increase savings). The proportion of
households who are reported savers/deleveragers vs. spenders is stable across the local
housing price change distribution. This suggests it was not the difference in proportion
of these groups which led to lower MPC in the hardest hit areas.
Figure 1.11 and 1.12 show the discrepancy between hard hit areas and other areas
comes instead from the behavior of reported savers and deleveragers. In the hardest hit
tercile, savers and deleveragers truly do not spend out of the rebate at all as their MPC is
zero. However, in other areas, they spend around 10-20% of the rebates on nondurables
in the month of receipt. On the other hand, the MPC of reported spenders is similar
27
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These results suggest the role of debt salience in driving differences in responses to
the ESA payments. In the hardest hit areas, the gap between reported and revealed
preferences are the lowest while in other areas, this gap is much higher. If households
were really debt salient in the hardest hit areas, they would possibly follow through
much more seriously on their plans to save/deleverage out of the rebates, while those
who were less debt salient would do this less strictly.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown empirically how the effectiveness of fiscal rebates var-
ied with local housing price declines in 2008. Using a combination of Zillow housing
price data, the Nielsen Consumer Panel and a supplemental Economic Stimulus Pay-
ments survey, I analyzed the local average MPC out of rebates provided in the 2008
Economic Stimulus Act. The randomization of the 2008 rebates allows me to causally
estimate MPC using a distributed lag regression framework. I establish the primary
result: average MPC out of 2008 fiscal rebates was smaller in areas where local house
prices declined more sharply. These results are robust to the exact specification of the
regression, including the use of housing supply elasticity as an instrumental variable. I
also show this trend is general across households with and without liquid assets, and
across households with higher and lower incomes. I also show that households in areas
where housing prices fell by different levels were similar in terms of socio-economic
characteristics. Finally, I show that this is driven by the relative difference in behavior of
reported savers and deleveragers.
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Chapter 2




The results in Chapter 1 present a dilemma for the design of targeted transfer poli-
cies. Prior research on MPC heterogeneity by income or cash on hand has found that
financially constrained households have a higher MPC. In this case, targeted transfers
to such households may be desirable both because they stimulate aggregate demand,
and because such redistribution is beneficial from a utilitarian perspective: there is no
tradeoff between the utilitarian and aggregate demand stabilization motives for targeted
transfers. Results in Chapter 1 suggest, however, that transferring resources to regions
most affected by a recession characterized by a collapse in housing wealth - who ar-
guably need financial support the most - may be less effective in stimulating aggregate
demand. In this sense, there is a tradeoff between utilitarian and aggregate demand
stabilization motives for rebate provision.
These results also pose a puzzle for consumption models. In a canonical buffer stock
model of consumption and saving, consumption is a concave function of net wealth:
1 Based on work co-authored with Keshav Dogra at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I acknowl-
edge computing resources from Columbia University’s Shared Research Computing Facility project, which
is supported by NIH Research Facility Improvement Grant 1G20RR030893-01, and associated funds from
the New York State Empire State Development, Division of Science Technology and Innovation (NYSTAR)
Contract C090171, both awarded April 15, 2010.
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households whose wealth declines more, because of a fall in local house prices, should
have a higher propensity to consume out of a tax rebate. To the extent that borrow-
ing constraints are linked to house prices, a fall in house prices should also tighten
borrowing constraints, increasing the MPC further. Thus the canonical model predicts
a positive relation between the size of local house price declines and MPC. Empirical
results in Chapter 1 indicate precisely the opposite.
The recent literature on household consumption has gone beyond the buffer stock
model by incorporating a distinction between liquid and illiquid assets, and a richer
treatment of housing, mortgage debt, and default. A priori, these features might reverse
the counterfactual predictions of the buffer stock model. To understand whether this
is possible quantitatively, I develop a heterogenous agent, life cycle, partial equilibrium
model featuring illiquid houses, long term mortgage debt, a refinance option, and a de-
fault option. The model allows for three channels which might in principle generate a
lower MPC in regions with a larger housing crisis. First, the model features wealthy hand
to mouth households (Kaplan and Violante (2014)) who hold substantial illiquid wealth,
but generally do not adjust wealth in response to transitory income shocks, thus acting
like hand-to-mouth households with a high MPC. Large aggregate shocks might force
these households to adjust, making them effectively unconstrained and reducing their
MPC. Second, households can use a fiscal rebate to pay down long term debt, as sug-
gested by the literature on balance-sheet households (Sahm et al. (2015)); if they are more
willing to do so in crisis-affected regions, these regions would have a lower MPC. Finally,
rebates can discourage households from making discrete adjustment decisions (such as
default) which increase their consumption in the short term, giving these households a
strongly negative MPC. To quantify the effect of these channels, I simulate two regional
economies, calibrated to the average region in tercile 1 and tercile 2 of the distribution of
house price declines. I subject each model economy to exogenous falls in house prices
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and income in line with each region’s experience during the Great Recession.2 I then
calculate the MPC out of a temporary cash rebate in each model economy, and study
how these vary with the decline in local house prices.
Quantitatively, the channels described above fail to reverse the predictions of a buffer
stock model: the model generates a slightly higher MPC in regions experiencing a larger
decline in house prices, contrary to the empirical results. This is for three reasons. First,
large falls in housing wealth do not directly force homeowners to pay the transaction
cost of moving house or refinancing their mortgage. If anything, cash-out refinancing
becomes harder to engage in during a housing crisis, due to stricter collateral require-
ments. Thus households in the more crisis-affected region do not end up with much
higher liquid wealth, and do not have a much lower MPC. Second, the model does
feature substantial deleveraging in the aggregate, especially in the more crisis-affected
region. But while the average homeowner does use some of the rebate to pay down the
debt at the margin, this marginal deleveraging effect is weaker in areas with larger house
price declines. Finally, the model does feature “default switchers” who default without
a rebate, but not if they receive a rebate. Default switchers do have a strongly negative
MPC, as they keep making mortgage payments if they do receive a rebate, reducing
their consumption. But with a $1,000 rebate, there are simply not enough of them to
substantially affect the aggregate MPC, much less to generate the regional differences in
MPC observed in the data. Overall, the buffer stock intuition remains a good guide to
the predictions of a richer model of housing and consumption: households experiencing
a larger decline in wealth should have a slightly higher MPC. The empirical results are
sharply at odds with this class of models.
In buffer-stock models, a fall in permanent income reduces the MPC out of transi-
tory income. If households’ expected future income fell more in regions experiencing
a deeper housing crisis, this would decrease the MPC in those regions. The baseline
2Importantly, I allow for the decline in aggregate income and increase in unemployment to be corre-
lated with the decline in local house prices, as observed in the data.
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experiment allows this channel to some extent, by assuming perfect foresight regarding
average future income, implying that households in the worst affected regions expected
a slightly lower path of future income, in line with the data. This was not enough to
generate the low MPC observed empirically. An alternative hypothesis is that house-
holds in the worst-hit regions expected their future income to fall even more than it did
ex post. Using regional data on income expectations from the Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers, I rule out this possibility. The 2008-10 period was characterized by a general
fall in income expectations, but there was no substantial differential decline for areas
with larger decline in housing prices. This suggests a fall in expected permanent income
cannot explain the empirical findings quantitatively.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the pol-
icy implications of the empirical results in detail. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
implications of the results. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Policy Implications
In the presence of MPC heterogeneity, targeted transfers which redistribute from one
group in the population to another can potentially boost employment and output (Oh
and Reis (2012), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014a)). The results in Chapter 1 suggest a
dilemma for policymakers attempting to design such targeted transfer programmes.
Prior research on MPC heterogeneity such as Broda and Parker (2014) has found that
financially constrained households have a higher MPC out of fiscal rebates. In such a
scenario, targeted rebates to such households achieve a dual purpose; they stimulate
aggregate demand more through the higher MPC, and they are provided to households
who are more in need of financial support. While I do not take a stand on what the util-
itarian benchmarks are, it is safe to say that most policymakers would want to provide
financial support to people who have lost more wealth or income and are struggling
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financially during a recession. In this scenario, there is no tradeoff between utilitarian
and aggregate demand stabilization motives for targeted transfers; rebates can achieve
both goals.
The empirical results suggest, however, that transferring resources to the regions
most affected by a recession - who arguably need financial support the most - may
have been less effective in stimulating aggregate demand during the Great Recession.
If policymakers want to provide financial support to the individuals and regions worst
affected by the recession, they might have to forego the possibility of a high aggregate
MPC out of the rebates. While this could mean that many of these households pay their
debts and stay current on mortgages, the aggregate demand stabilization goal becomes
harder to meet. In this sense, there is a tradeoff between the utilitarian and aggregate
demand stabilization motives for rebate distribution.
In order to fix ideas, it is useful to consider a stylized general equilibrium model
that highlights the tradeoffs between the various motives for redistribution. A closed
national economy consists of I regions which share a common currency and monetary
policy. Households in region i spend some fraction α of their income on locally produced
goods, and the remaining 1− α on nationally produced goods. To create a role for fiscal
policy in stabilizing aggregate demand, it is necessary to assume that prices are not
fully flexible (otherwise there would be no role for aggregate demand stabilization at
all) and monetary policy is constrained (otherwise monetary policy would be able to
fully stabilize demand, without the need for fiscal intervention). Suppose for simplicity
that nominal wages are fixed in the short run (date 1) and flexible in the long run (dates
t > 1). Thus at date 1 (which represents the recession), households may potentially be
rationed in the labor market. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound;
at dates t > 1, monetary policy is unconstrained, and targets a given level of inflation.
At date 1, a government raises a fixed amount of resources via lump sum taxes,
and can choose how to distribute these resources to households in various regions via
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nonnegative fiscal transfers. Appendix B.1 presents a full description of the model, and
shows that under an optimal allocation of transfers across regions, in each region which
















where gj denotes the social marginal utility of the representative household in region
j, relative to the marginal value of public funds for the government; τ j denotes the labor
wedge in region j, which is positive if that region is in a recession; and mj denotes the
average MPC in region j. This equation states that the government is more willing to
make transfers to region j under three conditions. First, transfers to j are more desirable
if that region has a high social marginal utility gj (i.e. low consumption). Indeed, if all
labor wedges were equal to zero, so there was no motive for aggregate demand stabiliza-
tion, this formula would reduce to gj = 1, stating that the government seeks to smooth
social marginal utility across regions. Second, to the extent that labor wedges are posi-
tive (indicating a recession), transfers to j are more desirable if that region has a higher
MPC mj, so the recipients will spend more on both local and nationally produced goods,
increasing output and employment and closing labor wedges. Finally, to the extent that
there is home bias in consumption (α > 0), transfers to a region are more desirable if that
region experiences a more severe local recession (τ j > 0), since households will spend
some of those transfers locally and reduce the local labor wedge.
Clearly then, if the same regions have high social marginal utility gj, high MPC
mj, and deep local recessions τ j, the policymaker faces no tradeoff: she should simply
target all transfers to these regions, which need the most, spend the most, and benefit
the most from higher spending. The empirical results suggest, however, that regions
with larger declines in house prices - which faced deeper local recessions3 - had the
3Whether these regions had higher or lower social marginal utility is less obvious, even abstracting
the possibility that a policymaker might assign different welfare weights to households in different re-
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lowest MPC out of fiscal rebates. In this scenario, regionally targeted transfers are a
less effective tool. Directing transfers towards regions experiencing the largest fall in
house prices helps mitigate the most severe local recessions, but has a limited effect
(especially at the aggregate level) because households in these regions are unwilling to
spend. Targeting transfers to regions without a severe housing crisis, on the other hand,
stimulates aggregate demand to a greater extent, but fails to direct help to the regions
most affected.
2.3 Theory
In order to analyze MPC in a data analogous environment, I develop a heterogeneous
agent, partial equilibrium, life cycle model of consumption, housing and default choice.
Next, I subject the model to a recession similar to the one observed in 2008 in which
housing prices fell and unemployment rose. The model robustly predicts that the MPC
is, if anything, slightly higher in regions experiencing a larger decline in house prices -
contrary to the empirical findings in Chapter 1.
The model contains four additions relative to a standard life-cycle consumption
model: illiquid houses, long term mortgage debt, a refinancing option, and a default
option. Households can save either in the form of liquid wealth or illiquid houses.
They can only borrow against their home equity relative to a loan to value constraint, in
the form of long-term debt with a schedule of minimum required mortgage payments.
Households must pay a transaction cost either to increase their mortgage debt relative
to their payment schedule (i.e. to refinance), or to move house. Finally, households can
default on their mortgage, in which case they lose their home, they no longer have to
gions. On average, the regions with the lowest third of house price changes were slightly richer than the
middle third of regions, which would suggest higher consumption and lower marginal utility. However,
households in these regions were likely more likely to be financially constrained, which would indicate
temporarily high marginal utility. In either case, the tradeoff between making transfers to regions with a
high MPC versus regions with a deep local recession remains.
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make a mortgage payment, and they suffer a utility cost. This cost captures the sum
of both pecuniary costs associated with defaulting on a mortgage4 and the moral and
social stigma associated with default.5
Since households can save in either a liquid or an illiquid asset, model features both
households with very low net worth and households with high illiquid wealth but little
liquid wealth, who behave as hand to mouth consumers. As in Kaplan and Violante
(2014), the presence of these wealthy hand to mouth households allows the matching
of steady state MPC observed in the data without a counterfactually large number of
households with low net worth. When subjected to an exogenous fall in house prices
and income and an increase in unemployment risk, calibrated to the Great Recession,
the model matches several important features of this episode - a tightening of loan to
value constraints, a fall in house prices which pushed many homeowners underwater, a
fall in refinancing activity, and a spike in defaults.6
In order to see whether the model can explain the relation between house price
declines and MPC out of fiscal rebates observed empirically, I simulate two regional
economies, calibrated to the average region in tercile 1 and tercile 2 of the distribution
of house price declines, respectively. I subject each model economy to a fall in house
prices and income, and an increase in unemployment risk, in line with each region’s
experience during the 2008-2012. I then calculate the MPC out of a $1,000 lump sum
transfer in each model economy (that is, the average difference in consumption between
a household who receives the rebate, and an identical household who never receives the
rebate).
4In nonrecourse mortgages, defaulting does not lead to garnishing of wages, but credit scores are
demolished, and borrowing in the future becomes much more difficult.
5 Guiso et al. (2013) argue that the majority of homeowners have moral concerns about defaulting on
their mortgage.
6In this regard, the results are also related to a recent literature (e.g. Ganong and Noel (2016)) which
argues that a combination of negative income shocks and negative housing wealth shocks is necessary to
generate default. Bhutta et al. (2010) find that median homeowners only started strategically defaulting
purely based on home equity losses after equity fell to -62 % of home’s value. See also Foote et al. (2008).
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The canonical buffer stock model of consumption predicts that consumption is a
concave function of total financial resources (Carroll and Kimball (1996)). 7 Thus all
else equal, a fall in net worth should lead to a higher MPC out of transitory income.
Clearly, the empirical result would be hard to explain within such a benchmark model.
Importantly, the model allows for three channels which might in principle reverse the
counterfactual predictions of the buffer stock model.
First, the model features a significant number of wealthy hand-to-mouth (WHTM)
households in the sense of Kaplan and Violante (2014). These households hold sub-
stantial illiquid wealth, yet have the high MPC associated with liquidity constrained
households, because they hold little liquid wealth and generally prefer not to adjust
illiquid wealth in response to transitory income shock. In principle, WHTM households
may have a smaller MPC out of transitory income when faced with a larger recession;
this shock forces them to pay the transaction cost and withdraw from their liquid as-
set, making them effectively unconstrained, and so less responsive to rebates. Whether
households facing a deeper recession actually have a higher MPC, though, depends on
whether they are able to withdraw from their illiquid asset. In the model, withdrawals
take the form of cash out refinancing: if households facing a deeper recession cashed out
more of their housing equity, they would be flush with liquidity and would have a lower
MPC out of fiscal stimulus. However, during the Great Recession, collateral constraints
(both Loan-to-Value ratio and Debt-to-Income Ratio) tightened, making it difficult for
homeowners to take remaining equity from their houses. This was especially hard for
households in areas with larger housing price declines, who were more likely to have
negative equity and so to be unable to take advantage of cash out refinancing.8 Once
Iimpose that loan to value constraints tighten during the recession, in line with the U.S.
experience, households in areas with large housing crisis actually have less liquid assets
7 Appendix B.2 revisits this result in detail.
8This is a point argued by Beraja et al. (2017) who show QE1 primarily helped households in areas
with less severe local recessions to refinance.
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and a higher MPC. Overall, this effect pushes the MPC higher in regions with a larger
decline in house prices.
The counterfactual predictions of the buffer stock model could also be reversed if
households in regions experiencing a larger decline in house prices were more likely
to use their rebate checks to pay down debt (and so less likely to use the checks to
finance current spending). Indeed 47% of households in the NCP sample say they were
planning to mostly pay off debt with their rebates. To allow for this possibility, the model
features long-term mortgages and allows free prepayment of mortgages relative to the
amortization schedule. As housing prices fall, a significant proportion of homeowners
become underwater on their mortgages. As the interest costs of mortgages are relatively
high, some homeowners have an incentive to use rebates to pay back their debt. If the
marginal deleveraging effect becomes stronger with a larger fall in housing prices, the
average MPC can be smaller, matching the pattern observed in the data.
Finally, the model could in principle generate a lower MPC in more crisis-affected
regions through the interaction between household default decisions and rebate receipt.
9Most households will either default whether or not they receive a rebate, or will never
default; but there will be some small fraction of ‘default switchers’ who default if they
do not receive a rebate (because the benefit of higher consumption today outweighs the
utility cost of default), but do not default if they receive a rebate.10 While these house-
holds have higher welfare if they receive a rebate and are dissuaded from defaulting,
they have significantly lower current consumption, since they keep making mortgage
payments. Thus these households can have a significantly negative MPC if their mort-
gage payment is large relative to the size of the rebate.11 If the proportion of default
9Details of such behavior is expanded in a model in Appendix B.3.
10Empirically, it seems reasonable to assume that relatively small changes in cash on hand can affect
default decisions. Fuster and Willen (2015) show that cutting mortgage payments in half reduced the
probability of delinquency by 55% during the crisis of 2008.
11Here by MPC I mean the treatment effect of rebate receipt, i.e. the difference between a household’s
consumption with the rebate and without, divided by the size of the rebate. Since the household’s con-
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switchers is much larger in regions with a more severe housing crisis, this mechanism
can drive down the average MPC in these regions.
Whether all of these mechanisms actually allow the model to match the relation
between MPC and housing price declines observed in the data, though, is a quantitative
question. I use the calibrated version of the model to understand how significant all of
these mechanisms can be in a data-analogous environment, and how they interact.
2.3.1 Model Setup
Demographics and preferences: Households live for J periods and retire at age Jr < J.






βj−1[U(ci,t+j, hi,t+j)− χUdi,t+j] + βJB(mi,t+J+1)
}
,
where β is the discount factor, ci,t+j denotes nondurable consumption, hi,t+j housing
services, di,t+j is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household defaults on a mortgage
at date t + j and 0 otherwise, and mi,t+J+1 denotes cash bequests. Preferences are Cobb-
Douglas over nondurable consumption and housing services (to match the fact that
households mostly spend a fixed proportion of income on either of these categories)
with a weight of α on nondurables relative to housing services in period utility. The








Income process: Household’s income during working years (j ≤ Jr) yi,t contains
life-cycle, idiosyncratic and aggregate components:
ln yi,t =

u with probability γt
ln Zt + ψj + zi,t with probability (1− γt)
sumption function is neither differentiable nor even continuous in the present of discrete choices such as
default, it is not possible to define the MPC as the derivative of the consumption.
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and
zi,t = ρzi,t−1 + ηi,t,
where ψj is a deterministic age profile common to all households, zi,t is the idiosyncratic
component of income, ρ is the persistence of the idiosyncratic component and ηi,t is
the idiosyncratic income shock. The idiosyncratic shock is normally distributed with
standard deviation ση. With probability γt, household income is equal to a low value u,
which I interpret as the value of unemployment insurance.12 When solving the model
numerically, I discretize income shocks using Tauchen’s method with 10 nodes. Finally,
retired households (j > Jr) receive a constant benefit yr.
Housing and other assets: Households can hold three assets. The first asset is a
one period bond m which pays a constant return of r every period. Households can-
not borrow in this bond. The second asset is housing. In any period, a household is
either a house owner or a renter. Owners must hold an amount of housing equal to
the flow of housing services that they consume. I use hi,t to denote both the quantity
of housing owned and the flow of services it provides. The price of one unit of owner-
occupied housing is pt. Owners can choose from a finite set of possible house sizes,
H = {h1, ..., hN}. Renters must hold a house which delivers a smaller flow of housing
services, h0 < h1.
Households can also take out mortgages. Given a mortgage of size bi,t, a household
must make a minimum payment φbi,t each period. Debt accumulates at an interest rate
rm. When the household makes only the minimum payment, debt evolves according to
bi,t+1 = (1+ rm − φ)bi,t
If φ = rm, the mortgage is unamortized; if φ > rm, it is amortized.
When households adjust their level of hi,t, the level of their housing asset, they must
pay a fixed cost κh. This cost captures both the closing costs of buying a new house and
12When a household exits the low income state, which happens with probability 1− γt, they draw the
idiosyncratic component of productivity zi,t from its stationary distribution.
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getting a new mortgage. When households increase debt, choosing bi,t+1 > (1 + rm −
φ)bi,t (which I interpret as cash-out refinancing), they must pay a fixed cost of κb. This
cost captures the closing costs of cash out refinance. However, households can pay down
debt ahead of schedule without incurring any cost. This allows for the possibility that
households use their rebates to pay down debt, as prepayment of mortgage is the only
possible deleveraging channel in the model. In reality, costs of buying a new house are
larger than cash out refinancing costs, hence I impose κh > κb > 0. If households pay κh
and adjust their house, they can adjust their mortgage for free.
When households adjust their mortgage or house, their borrowing must respect a
loan-to-value (LTV) constraint: bi,t+1 ≤ θb pt+1hi,t+1 if they adjust only the mortgage,
and bt+1 ≤ θh pt+1hi,t+1 if they adjust their housing. I allow θb to be greater than θh as
most refinancing LTV constraints are less strict compared to initial downpayment rules.
If households rent, they pay ρR each period.
Default: Households have the option to default on their mortgage. If they default,
they lose their debt and house immediately. I potentially allow for a one-off utility
cost of default χU. As is standard in models of default, χU is intended to capture both
the pecuniary costs of defaulting on a mortgage, and the stigma associated with this
decision.
Bequest motive: Finally, households receive ‘warm glow’ utility from cash bequests,
of the following form: where ψ0 is the parameter that regulates the warm glow from
such bequests. I assume homeowners sell their houses and rent in the final year of life












+ pt(hi,t − hi,t−1)− bi,t+11+ rm =yi,t + mi,t − bi,t − δ1{hi,t = h0}
− κh1{hi,t 6= hi,t−1}
− κb1{bi,t+1 > (1+ rm − φ)bi,t and hi,t = hi,t−1}




+ pt(hi,t − hi,t−1)− bi,t+11+ rm = yi,t + mi,t − bi,t − δ1{hi,t = h0} − κh
for homeowners who receive a moving shock.
The household problem can be written recursively as a collection of seven value
functions. For j < J, these are defined recursively as follows:
• The value of not owning a house at the start of a period is the maximum of a)
the value of keeping on renting against b) the value of adjusting into being a
homeowner.
V0j (m, z) = max{VRj (m, z), VAj (m, 0, 0, z)}
1. The value of continuing to rent today:
VRj (m, z) =maxc,x′
U(c, h0) + βEzV0j+1(m
′, z′)
s.t. c + δpjh0 + m′ ≤ (1+ r)m + yj(z)
m′ ≥ 0
2. The value of adjusting one’s house (transitioning from renting to owning):
VAj (m, b, h, z) = maxc,x′,b′,h′
U(c, h) + βEzVHj+1(m
′, b′, h′, z′)
s.t. c + pjh′ + m′ − b′ ≤ (1+ r)m− (1+ rm)b + pjh + yj(z)− κh
m′ ≥ 0
b′ ≤ θpj+1h′; h′ ∈ H
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• The value of having a home at the start of the period is the maximum of a) the
value of adjusting the house level ( from owning a house to owning a different size
of house), b) the value of selling home and becoming a renter, c) the value of cash
out refinancing, d) the value of not adjusting, and e) the value of defaulting.
VHj (m, b, h, z) = max{VAj (m, b, h, z), VSj (m, b, h, z),
VBj (m, b, h, z), V
N(m, b, h, z), VD(m, z)− χU}
1. The value of adjusting one’s house (transitioning from renting to owning):
VAj (m, b, h, z) = maxc,x′,b′,h′
U(c, h) + βEzVHj+1(m
′, b′, h′, z′)




2. The value of selling one’s home and becoming a renter:
VSj (m, b, h, z) =maxc,x′
U(c, h0) + βEzV0j+1(m
′, z′)
s.t. c + δpjh0 + m′ ≤ (1+ r)m− (1+ rm)b + pjh + yj(z)− κh
m′ ≥ 0
3. The value of refinancing (adjusting mortgage, but not the house):
VBj (m, b, h, z) =maxc,x′,b′
U(c, h) + βEzVHj+1(m
′, b′, h, z′)




4. The value of not adjusting:
VNj (m, b, h, z) =maxc,x′
U(c, h) + βEzVHj+1(m
′, (1+ rm − φ)b, h, z′)
s.t. c + m′ ≤ (1+ r)m + yj(z)
m′ ≥ 0
5. The value of defaulting:
VDj (m, z) =maxc,x′
U(c, h0) + βEzVDj+1(m
′, z′)
s.t. c + (1+ χR)δpjh0 + m′ ≤ (1+ r)m + yj(z)
m′ ≥ 0
At date J, I impose that owners must sell their house and become a renter, so
VHJ (m, b, h, z) = V
S
j (m, b, h, z) and V
0
J (m, z) = V
R
J (m, z). Finally, I have
V0J+1(m, z) = V
H






A solution to the household problem is computed by starting at the last period of
life j = J and optimally choosing between consuming all their assets and leaving some
bequests. I then solve for policies and values in prior periods by backward induction. In
the steady state simulation of the model, I simulate 10,000 households.
2.3.2 Calibration
Externally calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.1. The model period is one
year, and I calibrate steady state to 2005-2006 data. I set J = 55 and Jr = 35: households
enter the labor market at age 25, retire at age 60, and die at age 80. I set ρ = 0.91 and
ση = 0.21 following Floden and Linde (2001). I also follow Kaplan and Violante (2010)
to capture the annual life cycle component of earnings ψj using PSID data. I scale up
average income so that the median income of 45-54 year olds is consistent with median
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income of households whose head was 45-54 years old in 2005. After converting to 2008
dollars, and assuming a 20% flat tax rate, this gives a median income of $53, 333 for
45-54 year olds. I set the fixed retirement income at $28, 000 in 2008 nominal dollars
to match the median income of households whose head was 65+ in 2005.13 Finally,
I set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ equal to 0.5, similar to much of
previous literature. I set the real return on the liquid asset to −1.5% following Kaplan
and Violante (2014) and derive the average interest rate on mortgages from the data. All
of these are real, risk adjusted after-tax returns. I set the LTV constraint θh at 0.8 for a
new house, and allow households to borrow up to house price with θb = 1.14 I set the
amortization rate φ at 4% of principal every year to match the half life of a regular 30-
year fixed rate mortgage (which describes the majority of the US mortgage market). The
households in the model are provided with initial wealth in the form of liquid assets.
I measure initial wealth in the SCF for individuals at age 22, and select 10 bins which
receive different levels of initial wealth at age j = 1 in the model. I allow for three
different sizes of owner-occupied houses.
Table 2.1: Externally calibrated parameters
Parameters Values Parameters Values
J 55 φ 0.04
Jr 35 α 0.8
σ 2 r -1.5 %
ρ 0.91 rm 2 %
σn 0.21 ρR 0.09
ψj PSID θn 0.85
yr 0.25 θb 1
This leaves us with six free parameters:15 the discount factor β, the cost of adjusting
13 While this is a simplification, the analysis is mostly focused on non-retirees.
14This assumption is especially important as I am attempting to understand the balance sheets of US
households between 2006 and 2008.
15I set the utility cost of default χ = 0 in steady state. In the recession experiments, I choose χ in order
to match default rates in the data, as I describe below.
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houses and mortgages κh, κb, the probability of exogenous ‘moving shocks’ pmove, the
housing services provided by a rental apartment h0, and ψ0, which affects the utility of
bequests. I calibrate these parameters to match six moments. Average rebate efficacy
depends on proportion of constrained households in the population and the general
level of wealth. Hence I target the percentage of households with houses but with less
than 2 months of income in liquid assets, which is 32.2% according to the 2007 SCF. The
ratio of median illiquid wealth to average income is used to match the wealth to income
distribution. I choose median over mean illiquid wealth to target the bottom 80% of the
income distribution, whose moments are better proxied by medians than means. I use
SCF 2007 and set the target statistic at 1.605. Frequency of mortgage adjustment (cash out
refinancing) is both a significant method for consumption smoothing for homeowners
and is restricted during housing recessions. I follow Bhutta and Keys (2016) who find
around 12.5% of borrowers already had a mortgage and extracted equity from their
houses in 2001. On the frequency of housing sales, I use data from the CPS which shows
6.6% of homes were sold in 2007. Finally, I target homeownership rates. Homeownership
rate is based on 2007 data from the Census Bureau.16 I target the total bequest wealth
to total wealth (the bequest transfer ratio) for the bottom 80% of the US population. De
Nardi (2004) finds the wealth transfer ratio for the bottom 80% is 0.148.
These six parameters are chosen to match aggregate US data when house prices,
average income, and unemployment risk are calibrated to the aggregate US economy.
In these experiments, however, I simulate two model economies, one corresponding to
the lowest tercile of the distribution of house price changes (tercile 1) and the other
corresponding to the middle tercile (tercile 2). I allow the path of house prices, average
income, and unemployment risk to vary across the two economies in line with 2005 data.
This gives us a steady state median house price of $393,000 in 2008 nominal dollars for
tercile 1, and $257,000 for tercile 2 (based on Zillow data). Median income is $60,000 for
16 https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr12-20.pdf
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tercile 1 and $59,000 for tercile 2; I set γ = 0.05 in both regions to match the average
2005 county-level unemployment rate. I also allow the utility from housing services to
differ between the two regions: this allows us to match home ownership rates in the two
regions, given the difference in steady state house prices. All remaining parameters are
set to the same values for both model economies.
Table 2.2: Targeted moments
Parameter Value Target Data Model
Discount factor β 0.955 Median illiquid wealth/income 1.61 1.56
Cost of adjusting house κh 0.09 % of WHTMs 0.32 0.29
Cost of increasing mortgage κb 0.07 % borrowers who refinanced 0.13 0.12
Probability of moving shock ξ 0.0075 Frequency of housing sales 0.06 0.07
Utility from bequests ψ0 1.6 Bequest to wealth ratio 0.15 0.15
Utility from rental apt h0 Home ownership rate
Tercile 1 2.6 Tercile 1 0.66 0.68
Tercile 2 4.0 Tercile 2 0.67 0.69
Parameters: Table 2.2 summarizes the estimated parameters and targeted moments
in the data and in the model. I obtain discount factor β = 0.955, in line with the
literature. The fixed cost of adjusting housing (κh) is chosen to be 9,000 in 2008 dollars,
while the fixed cost of cash out refinancing κb is set to 6,000 dollars. The moment
matching procedure gives a moving shock probability of 0.75% per year.
Fit for Non-Targeted Moments: The model matches some key moments of the data
that were not used in the calibration exercise. Table B.2 in the Appendix reports both the
distribution of liquid assets for renters and homeowners and LTV for homeowners. The
model reproduces lower end percentiles of the liquid asset distributions for homeowners
well. It undershoots the 75th percentile. For renters, the model is close to matching the
10th and 25th percentiles well and I overshoot the median. While the model overshoots
the median LTV in the data, it matches the 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles of LTV pretty
well.
The model also matches the consumption smoothing motive which is key to a life-
cycle model. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that steady state mean life cycle patterns of
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several variables in the model are realistic. Consumption is hump shaped as households
save for retirement. Consumption is less volatile compared to income, which matches
the standard consumption smoothing result. Housing wealth peaks at retirement and
slowly gets used by households at the end of their lives. Liquid wealth builds up close
to retirement as in the data. In the model liquid wealth builds up at the end of life, as I
force households to only provide bequests in liquid assets. Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows
home ownership rate goes up to 90% at age 50 and stays at that level, and I see the same
trend in the data.
Figure 2.1: Mean Life Cycle and Home Ownership Rate over Life Cycle
Age



































Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows an example of a simulated life cycle in the model.
The individual starts work life at age 25, buys a house initially with some liquid as-
sets provided by her parents with a downpayment. She takes out housing equity at
various points in her life. The income graph moves around due to stochastic shocks to
the individual’s income. The wealth built up throughout working life is then used for
smoothing consumption during the retirement period, which starts at age 60 and goes
till age 80.
I match the variation in the proportion of wealthy hand-to-mouth households (de-
fined as households with homes who have limited amount of liquid assets) by age when
compared to the SCF in 2007 ( Figure B.2 in the Appendix). The model has on av-
erage slightly more wealthy hand to mouth households (WHTM) in their middle age
compared to the data and slightly lower poor hand to mouth households (PHTM). The
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model does not allow for bequests in illiquid assets, hence individuals decumulate hous-
ing equity in their final years of life. Because of this, the hand to mouth statistics do not
match the data in the final years of life. The model matches the distribution of hous-
ing loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) in steady state well (Figure B.3 in the Appendix). The
distribution of housing LTV is a crucial predictor of default probabilities. The model
generates a trend in housing LTV very similar to LTV for households in the 2007 SCF.
Housing LTVs are around 80-100% in the earliest years of life. As amortization depletes
mortgage values and households gain more housing equity, LTV ratios get smaller.
MPC in Steady State: I simulate the provision of a $1,000 rebate to households in
the model at steady state.17 Rebate is provided to 10,000 simulated households while no
rebates are provided to 10,000 identical households. I measure the MPC out of rebates
as the difference in their consumption in the period as a % of the rebate size. In steady
state, the average MPC is 20% of the rebate amount, which is close to the estimates from
previous empirical literature and the results. Similar to Berger et al. (2015), average MPC
is decreasing in income, housing size, liquid wealth and age (these correlations are all
assuming other variables are kept constant).
2.3.3 Recession Experiments
In order to reproduce the main empirical findings in the model, I analyze the dynamic
response after the two steady state economies (terciles 1 and 2) are shocked with both
housing wealth and income shocks. At t = 1, households become aware that the econ-
omy is entering a recessionary period. More specifically, they learn that their hous-
ing prices have fallen permanently, the probability of unemployment shocks γt will be
higher for the next 4 years and their mean income for the next 4 years will fall as well
(I use 4 periods of recession to mimic the 2008-2013 period; after 4 years, the income
17 The average rebate size in the empirical sample was $898.
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shocks revert to steady state values).18 In addition, I tighten the down-payment (from
85% to 80%) and refinancing (from 100% to 85%) LTV constraints during the period of
the recession. The timeline of the recession is shown in the following figure. Period t = 0
corresponds to the steady state, and t = 1 is the first period in which agents realize the
recession has started. At t = 1, 2, 3, 4, the economy stays in recession and moves to the
new steady state in t = 5. In the new steady state, the probability of unemployment
rates go back to initial steady state.













In order to mimic the variation in recession depth across the country, I allow the
two economies to have separate paths for housing prices, unemployment and median
incomes. I get the path of housing prices for both terciles from Zillow data, unem-
ployment rates from the BEA local unemployment rate series and median incomes from
the Census Bureau. Figure 2.2 shows the path for housing prices and unemployment.
Housing price levels were higher in tercile 1 in 2005-06, and fell much more than in
tercile 2 during the recession. The unemployment rate also rose by more in these areas.
Figure B.5 in the Appendix shows the path for median incomes, where the differences
are present, but weaker.
Further, I raise the cost of selling houses κh by a factor of 3 during the recession
period in both economies, in order to capture the fact that it became harder to sell a
house during the 2008 recession. By raising the cost of selling houses, I avoid poten-
tially counter-factual implications, such as a significant proportion of households mov-
ing house in response to a fall in house prices. The main result - the difference in MPC
between regions - remains identical whether I increase κh during the recession, or keep
18I choose fat tailed unemployment shocks in addition to fall in average incomes based on recent
research by Guvenen et al. (2014). The authors find that recessions are driven by left skewness of income
shocks, as both large upward income shocks do not happen and left tailed unemployment shocks become
much more likely.
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Finally, I utilize the last free parameter χU to match default rates in both economies.
I measure the default rate in the data as the proportion of mortgages that are more than
90 days delinquent in the fourth quarter of 2008, provided by Freddie Mac. I set χU = 4
in order to match default rates in model in data, averaging across both terciles, as shown
in Figure B.4. As expected, default rates in tercile 1 (7%) are higher than default rates in
tercile 2 (3%), in line with the data.

















In both of these economies, I provide an unanticipated $1,000 in rebates to one set
of households and no rebates to a set of identical households. After solving for their
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optimal responses, I study the differences in consumption between the two groups, and
calculate the MPC out of the rebate checks. The MPC across the two regions is shown
in Figure 2.4. The central result is that the MPC in tercile 1 is slightly higher than that
of tercile 2 (17.6% against 15.5%). As in a one asset buffer stock model, a richer model
of consumption and housing delivers a slight positive correlation of MPC with housing
price declines. This stands in sharp contrast with the empirical finding that the MPC
was substantially lower in tercile 1.









As discussed above, a canonical buffer stock model would predict a higher MPC
in tercile 1, which experiences a larger decline in house prices. The richer model of
housing and default allows for a number of channels that could in principle reverse
this prediction and match the pattern I documented empirically. Quantitatively though,
these channels fail to reverse the predictions of the buffer stock model.
The first channel that could in principle lower the MPC in tercile 1, relative to tercile 2,
is associated with households who switch from defaulting to servicing their debts when
they receive their rebates. These “default switcher" households have a strongly negative
MPC, as they are induced to keep on making mortgage payments by the rebate. Such
households are present in the model, and have a significantly negative MPC. However,
when the model is calibrated to generate a level of default in line with that observed
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during the Great Recession (around 7% of homeowners in tercile 1), there are simply
not enough households who would change their default decisions based on a $1,000
rebate. In the simulations, fewer than 0.1% of households are default switchers in either
tercile 1 or tercile 2; this reduces the average MPC for the full sample by less than a
percentage point. The contribution of default switcher households to changes in average
MPC between terciles 1 and 2 is close to zero, as shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Offsetting Channels








Figure 2.5 also shows offsetting effects due to refinancing switcher households. Simi-
lar to the default switcher households, some households choose to take cash out of their
housing equity when not provided a rebate. These households (refinance switchers)
have a very large negative MPC. However, as housing prices fall, collateral constraints
bind tighter and the proportion of these households gets smaller. This pushes the av-
erage MPC higher. This channel is analogous to the traditional borrowing constraints
channel in the literature. Figure 2.5 shows the contribution of this channel is also below
a percentage point. The largest contribution to the change in MPC between terciles 1 and
2 comes from the traditional buffer stock channel. A loss in wealth moves households to
a slightly more concave part of their consumption function, hence leading to a slightly
higher MPC.
The model is also useful in understanding the role of deleveraging in balance sheet
55
Figure 2.6: Aggregate Deleveraging
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recessions, and its effect on the MPC. Aggregate deleveraging is present and strong in
recession experiments. Figure 2.6 shows levels of total debt in the two economies as they
go through the recession. Both economies deleverage significantly. A large majority of
this is through default (debt gets charged off) and collateral constraints (down-payment
constraints are tighter, and new houses have lower debt). Deleveraging through pre-
payment of mortgages is present, but very weak. Kennedy et al. (2014) document that
around 70 percent of the 2007-2014 decline in mortgage debt in the United States oc-
curred as a consequence of charge-offs.
Do the households in the model use their rebates to pay down debt? Figure 2.7
shows the marginal propensity to deleverage out of rebates for households (who do not
default, refinance or move) in the two economies. Marginal deleveraging is present in
both economies. This is because of the interest differential, as mortgage rates have a high
interest rate. However, this marginal deleveraging effect is actually stronger in tercile 2
compared to tercile 1. The average household in tercile 1 only spends around 25 cents
on the dollar to prepay debt, while the household in tercile 2 spends over 50 cents on
the dollar to prepay debt.
For households who do not take discrete adjustment decisions, the following iden-
tity approximately holds true. Any transitory income provided to the household has
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to be either spent in nondurables (MPC), used for prepaying debt (MPD), or used to
accumulate liquid asset balances (MPM).
MPC + MPD + MPM ≈ 1
In the experiments, as housing prices fall, the MPC stays relatively constant, but the
households shift from deleveraging towards accumulating liquid assets. This is because
of the option value of accumulating liquid assets. For a given level of net worth, one
can either have high liquid assets and high levels of debt, or low liquid assets and low
debt. Having high levels of liquid assets and high levels of debt has costs in terms of
the interest differential. However, it has a key benefit, which is its option value. Having
higher checking account balances means one has more options to respond to shocks in
the future. This insurance benefit leads to a lower marginal delevaraging as housing
wealth gets more negative.
One key reason for why deleveraging does not significantly reduce the MPC is be-
cause there is no extra benefit to deleveraging for anyone moderately underwater beyond
the interest differential. A moderately underwater household in the model can wait it
out and pay off mortgage payments until they regain positive equity in the house. How-
ever, DiMaggio et al. (2014) find that in response to Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)
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resets that reduced households’ mortgage payments, borrowers with low or intermedi-
ate LTV ratios paid off other debt more quickly than deeply underwater homeowners.
Households in the model do not behave in this way, because achieving slightly positive
equity is not an important goal for them. Since they must pay an adjustment cost of
κb in order to extract equity, households must at least reach a value of home equity
greater than κb for equity extraction to even potentially be worthwhile; and since equity
extraction is costly, in practice homeowners will only pay the transaction cost if they can
extract a significant amount (Bhutta and Keys (2016) find homeowners on average ex-
tracted $23,000 in home equity when they took a cash-out refinance.) This suggests the
bar for positive home equity is much larger than κb. With fully rational agents, $1,000
cannot push moderately underwater agents to strongly deleverage.
2.3.4 Shift in Permanent Income Expectations
We have seen that both a canonical buffer stock model and a richer model of housing
and default fail to match the empirical finding that the MPC out of transitory income is
lower in areas experiencing a deeper local recession. I now consider the possibility that
more pessimistic expectations of permananent income in regions experiencing a deeper
housing crisis could resolve this puzzle.
In the canonical buffer stock consumption model, (see Carroll (2000)), the MPC out
of transitory income is increasing in a household’s permanent income. The ratio of con-
sumption C to permanent labor income P is a concave function of the ratio of current
resources X (defined as the sum of financial wealth and current income) to permanent







where c(x) is an increasing, concave function. It follows that the MPC out of transitory
















Thus to the extent that permanent income falls more in regions with a deeper housing
crisis, this should tend to reduce the MPC out of transitory income in these regions. In
fact, the model experiments decribed above already allowed for this possibility. These
experiments assumed that agents have perfect foresight regarding the path of average
income during the recession and recovery. Thus, in line with the data, average income
falls more in the areas with a deeper house price fall. Quantitatively, this difference was
not enough to generate a significantly lower MPC in these regions.
However, an alternative hypothesis is that households in counties experiencing a
housing crisis had more pessimistic expectations about the path of future income than
were borne out in the data ex post. Within the model, this translates into a larger fall
in permanent income for households in tercile 1. Qualitatively, this should lead to a
lower MPC, bringing the model closer in line with the data (to the extent that the buffer-
stock intution applies to the richer model). The question is how much heterogeneity in
households’ expectational errors we need in order to match the data, and whether this
degree of heterogeneity is plausible.
I test this hypothesis using expectations data from the Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers. The Survey asks a sample of American households about their expectations of
future house price changes, future income changes and future unemployment risk. I
utilize responses from 2005 to 2010, and combine this with the Zillow dataset on local
housing price declines. In particular, I take counties in the various terciles of the ∆H
distribution and find the average value of responses from the Michigan Survey. As the
survey does not directly ask households what they expect their future income to be, I
use three other questions; a) What do you think the chances are that your income will increase
by more than the rate of inflation in the next five years or so?; b) During the next 5 years, what
do you think the chances are that you (or your husband/wife) will lose a job you wanted to keep?
and c) By about what percent do you expect your income to (increase/decrease) during the next
12 months?
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Figure 2.8 shows mean responses for three groups of counties to question a). Con-
fidence that real income will rise in five years goes down across all groups between
2007 and 2010. On average, respondents believed that their real income would rise in
five years with a probability of 40% in 2005, and this probability drops to 33% in 2010.
However, this drop in expectations is not larger for tercile 1 compared to terciles 2 and
3.
Next, I look at question b) on the probability of unemployment in five years. Figure
2.9 shows the expectations of an unemployment spell also went up across all areas be-
tween 2005 and 2009. The full sample average increased from a low of 17% in 2007 to
21% in 2009. However, again, there is no differential trend in tercile 1 compared to the
others.











Finally, Figure 2.10 shows how much the average respondent in each group believed
income will go up/down in a year. Average expected changes in income drop from 5%
in 2005 to 1% in 2009. Again, these trends are similar across all three terciles.
















For a fall in expected permanent income to explain the empirical results, there needs
to be a very strong difference on future income expectations between the groups. There
is no support for this hypothesis in the Michigan Survey data. This suggests that the
empirical results in Chapter 1 are not driven by a very large differential fall in permanent
income expectations in areas where housing prices declined more.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I highlight the implications for policy and theory from the results of
Chapter 1. These results highlight a problem for policymakers, suggesting that fiscal
stimulus may have been least effective in stimulating nondurable consumption in the
regions experiencing the worst recession. This highlights the tradeoffs between the util-
itarian and aggregate demand stabilization motives for rebate provision.
I also discuss how these results pose challenges to consumption theory. To under-
stand these challenges in a realistic setting, I develop a heterogenous agent, life cy-
cle, partial equilibrium model featuring housing, mortgages and realistic collateral con-
straints. With such a model, I simulate various elements of a recession such as the one
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observed in 2008, including higher unemployment probability shocks, tighter downpay-
ment and refinancing constraints. Such a model delivers a stable correlation of MPC
with housing wealth shocks. I argue this is due to three reasons: the dependence of
MPC on liquid assets which do not change significantly, the quantitative weakness of
the mechanism by which rebate pushes households to avoid default and continue mort-
gage payments and finally the lack of incentives to sharply deleverage in a model with
long term mortgages. I also extend the analysis to other possibilities, such as differential
shift in expectations about permanent income. By getting regional income expectations
data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, I rule out the role of differential shift in
permanent income expectations in explaining the findings. Overall, I find a discrepancy
between household behavior and consumption theory in this dimension. I leave it for
future research to reconcile this discrepancy.
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Chapter 3
Evolution of Hand to Mouth Households (2007-09) and Lessons
3.1 Introduction
Heterogeneity in household liquidity is an important topic for both academics and pol-
icy practitioners. Studies consistently show such heterogeneity is highly correlated to
how households respond to transitory income changes. In particular, households with
low cash in hand (hand to mouth households) spend much more out of transitory in-
come changes. As most countercyclical stabilization policies (whether fiscal, monetary
or other credit supply policies) attempt to provide households with extra liquidity dur-
ing recessions, their effectiveness is clearly linked to household liquidity decisions. This
makes the study of household liquidity not just an interesting topic in consumer finance,
but a key issue for business cycle macroeconomics.
It is hence essential that we both measure the distribution of household liquidity
status well and understand the reasons behind the distribution. Is liquidity status a
reflection of deeper habits and preferences? Are low-cash households prone to persist
as low-cash in the future or is such status due to pure circumstance and hence unlikely
to persist? How do households manage their liquidity when they are going through a
large recession characterized by housing crisis and large negative shocks to their balance
sheets?1 These are all important questions which remain unanswered. This chapter
studies the final question, and provides suggestive evidence for the others.
These questions are important both for policy purposes and consumption theory.
1I use the terms housing crises recessions and balance sheet recessions interchangeably.
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Recent empirical literature has linked effectiveness of various countercyclical policies on
liquidity status. In particular, an extensive set of papers show fiscal policy effectiveness
depends on the proportion of households without significant cash in hand. Johnson
et al. (2006) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey to show households with low levels
of liquid assets had much larger marginal propensities to consume (MPC) out of the
2001 tax rebates. Johnson et al. (2013) repeat the findings from the 2008 rebates. In
subsequent analysis, Broda and Parker (2014), using the Nielsen Homescan Panel, ask
respondents if they have sufficient liquidity to cover two months of income. Households
who respond ‘Yes’ have close to zero spending responses to rebates in 2008, while house-
holds without sufficient liquidity show significantly higher spending responses. Misra
and Surico (2014) refine the Johnson et al. (2006) analysis by looking at the heterogeneity
in consumption responses across various groups. They use quantile regressions instead
of the OLS framework used by JPS. They find substantial heterogeneity in response to
stimulus checks. While half of the households do not change their consumption after
receiving the tax stimulus checks both in 2001 and 2008, around 20% of the families
spend above half of the stimulus checks. The group that spends the most out of rebate
checks has high mortgage debt and low liquidity. Similarly, Fagereng et al. (2016) show
that Norwegian lottery winners spend much more significantly out of lottery winnings
if they have low levels of liquid assets. Finally Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014b) use the
2010 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth to show households with low cash
in hand have significantly larger MPC out of transitory income changes.
A recent literature has also argued that monetary policy effectiveness relies on the
heterogeneity of household behavior. Auclert (2017) shows that if the MPC of those
who gain from accommodative monetary policy is larger than those who lose, then such
monetary policy has a larger effect on overall output. Again, MPC of households is cor-
related to their liquidity status. DiMaggio et al. (2014) measure consumption responses
for homeowners whose ARM mortgage resets led to lower mortgage rates during the
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recession. They find homeowners with low incomes and liquidity spend more out of the
the loosening of liquidity constraints caused by the mortgage rate resets.
While there are many reasons why households hold the liquidity levels they do, the
theoretical literature has generally followed two paths. I follow Gelman (2016) in dis-
tinguishing between studies that focus on circumstantial factors and those that focus
on persistent characteristics.2 The circumstance view has traditionally focused on a se-
ries of negative income shocks as the primary driver of hand to mouth status. In the
rational expectations life cycle model with one risk free asset as in Deaton (1991) or
Carroll (1997), households who receive such shocks are unable to consumption smooth
due to the lack of perfect credit markets. Such models imply the existence of one group
of hand to mouth households; those with very little net worth. These net worth con-
strained households spend large amounts out of transitory income shocks. However,
the proportion of households who are net worth constrained is too small to match the
empirical results on average MPC out of fiscal stimulus payments. Kaplan and Violante
(2014) use the tradeoff between return and liquidity to generate a group of wealthier
but financially constrained households; those who have parked their wealth in illiquid
assets such as houses. They call such households “Wealthy Hand to Mouth"(WHTM)
households. The presence of these households with higher MPC (around 15 to 20% of
the US population 3) along with traditional financially constrained households (“Poor
Hand to Mouth"(PHTM)) helps match the average MPC. Moreover, this newer model
can match bi-modal correlation of MPC with income, as illiquid households, both poor
and wealthier, have higher MPC. Another set of studies such as Hercowitz et al. (2009)
argue the presence of large consumption commitment concerns (such as future educa-
tion expenses for children) drives households to become WHTM. In all of these studies,
2While consumer preferences and characteristics can change over their life cycle, the literature gener-
ally ignores this possibility.
3 Kaplan and Violante (2014) use the Survey of Consumer Finances to measure proportion of hand to
mouth households with illiquid assets and find close to 15% of households fall under this category.
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low liquidity status is often temporary for the WHTM group, as households either be-
come illiquid while they are initially buying houses, or saving in illiquid assets for other
consumption commitments.
A second group of studies focuses on persistent preference or behavioral characteris-
tics of households. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) argue for the existence of two types of
consumers; patient and impatient. Impatient consumers always have low cash in hand,
and also have a high MPC out of transitory income changes. Laibson et al. (2003) high-
light self-control problems, where consumers often fail to achieve their optimal financial
outcomes, and remain hand to mouth. The same households spend significantly out of
transitory income changes. Reis (2006) is another paper in the same vein that focuses
on limited attention. Households with limited attention find it costly to acquire and
process information, hence choose to update their consumption plans infrequently. In
all of these examples, low liquidity is a sign of a deeper behavioral characteristic which
also causes stronger consumption responses to transitory income changes.
Distinguishing between the relative importance of either of the factors is very diffi-
cult. Ideally, one would require a large representative sample of households with full
information on financial balance sheets along all dimensions (liquid and illiquid assets,
debt, income) and panel features to control for household specific fixed effects. Tradi-
tional datasets on consumption (such as the CEX, PSID) either do not have panel fea-
tures, or do not have required information on financial balance sheets. Gelman (2016) is
a recent paper which uses data from a personal finance website to answer this question.
He finds that empirically, the characteristics view is as important as the circumstantial
view of household finances, and uses the empirical results to calibrate a model with dis-
count factor heterogeneity. Parker (2017) uses the panel element of the Nielsen Homes-
can Consumer Panel to ask if any prior characteristics can predict low liquidity. He finds
that households with low incomes two years in the past respond strongly to tax refund
payments compared to other households. He interprets this finding as suggestive of the
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importance of persistent characteristics such as preferences, and argues low permanent
income drives lack of consumption smoothing, not transitory income shocks, or trans-
action costs on illiquid wealth. Olafsson and Pagel (2016) use information from another
financial data management website to argue significant proportion of households spend
heuresitically. They argue this shows persistent behaviors for some households, which
suggests the importance of the characteristics view of hand to mouth households.
In light of this broader literature, measuring the proportion of hand to mouth house-
holds in an economy is an important topic. Kaplan et al. (2014) explore the historical
evolution of hand to mouth status in the United States using the Survey of Consumer
Finances. They analyze both poor and wealthy hand to mouth status between 1989 and
2010. The analysis shows between 25 and 40% of households in hand to mouth sta-
tus, with two thirds of such households being wealthy hand to mouth. Wealthy hand
to mouth households are generally richer than the PHTM, are slightly older (peaking
at above 40 years), hold significant illiquid wealth (median of 50,000 dollars) and have
higher education levels. They are however poorer and younger than the NHTM group.
Finally, Kaplan et al. (2014)’s demonstrate the stability in the proportion of hand to
mouth households between 1989 and 2010. Their analysis however mostly ignores hand
to mouth status during the Great Recession, which this chapter focuses on.
The first contribution of this chapter is to empirically measure how households man-
aged their finances and liquidity status during the Great Recession of 2008-10. Using
the panel version of the Survey of Consumer Finances panel data (2007 and 2009), I find
the overall proportion of HTM (both WHTM and NHTM) did not change between 2007
and 2009. I also find that this finding is robust to different definitions of liquid assets,
illiquid assets and hand to mouth status. While this result hints at the importance of
the characteristics view, the trends underneath the overall statistics tell a different story.
The panel feature of the 2007-09 SCF allows me to follow each household. Using this
feature, I find that there was significant movement between the NHTM and WHTM cat-
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egories. Almost half of the WHTM households in 2007 (7% of the sample in baseline)
gained liquidity buffers and switched to NHTM in 2009. Similarly, the same percentage
of the sample who were NHTM in 2007 switched to WHTM status in 2009. This result
is robust to defining the liquid, illiquid asset definitions and cutoffs for hand to mouth
in multiple ways.
The main contribution of the chapter is a deeper analysis of these results. I find
households who have larger losses to housing wealth and smaller losses to permanent
income expectations are more prone to building liquidity buffers in this period. While
this suggests the importance of circumstance (as in a traditional buffer stock model),
I argue a certain class of circumstantial models, those with net illiquid assets, are ill-
equipped to explaining such transitions. The Great Recession was a period with both a)
the largest changes in household wealth and b) largest increase in unemployment risk
since the Great Depression. Kaplan and Violante (2014), using a model with net illiquid
assets, argue that in a deep recession, households with money parked in illiquid assets
will find it worth the transaction costs to pull their money out. This is because the utility
loss from the large fall in consumption outweighs the transaction costs of taking wealth
out of illiquid assets. This effect should increase the amount of liquid assets across the
population distribution and lower the number of WHTM households.4 I however find
that this group did not change their status by actively liquefying their illiquid asset. In-
stead they did so while the valuations of their illiquid asset fell massively, which points
to them cutting consumption significantly. Hence, I argue; adding valuation effects on
the illiquid asset (such as houses) by separating housing wealth from mortgages is key
to match these facts.5 As housing valuations fell deeply, and a significant proportion
of households only held housing wealth as illiquid assets, refinancing constraints be-
came more binding. Hence, accessing illiquid wealth became much harder. Households
4This should also lower the overall MPC out of transitory income changes such as fiscal rebates.
5 Along with Keshav Dogra, I use such a model to study MPC in the other chapters.
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attempting to build liquidity buffers hence had only one margin to change in consump-
tion. On the other hand, I show that for households who lose liquidity buffers, past
income, age and education are better at predicting behavior than changes in income,
which suggests the role of characteristics based factors.
These results suggest a few lessons. First, there are roles for both circumstantial
and characteristics based theories on household liquidity and hand to mouth status
when analyzing deep recessions with housing crises. Second, understanding housing
crisis recessions require at the very least circumstantial models with assets and liabilities
separated; as valuation effects and their impact on borrowing constraints are key for a
significant proportion of households. Finally, these effects mean the largest margin of
adjustment for such households is through consumption.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Great Reces-
sion and the dataset. Section 3 discusses the main empirical results and lessons. Section
4 concludes.
3.2 Background and Data
The Great Recession of 2007-09 was the deepest recession since the Great Depression
of the 1930s. Between December 2007, when the recession started and June 2009 6, the
unemployment rate had increased from 5% to 10%. Real GDP fell by 4.3% between peak
and trough, and total personal consumption expenditures fell by 2.49%. This period was
also characterized by large losses to household and corporate wealth, as house prices fell
around 30% on average between mid-2006 to mid-2009 and the S&P 500 index fell by
57% between October 2007 and March 2009. Finally, net worth of households and non
profit organizations fell by 20% between 2007 and 2009.
6 The recession technically ended in June 2009 as per NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee, but
the negative effects lingered for multiple years
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Unlike other recessions in recent history, the Great Recession was unique, as it in-
volved the housing sector so prominently. As house prices declined severely during
the recession, significant proportions of American households were underwater on their
mortgages (as of 3Q 2009, 4.5 million homeowners)7. This led a large number of house-
holds to default on their mortgage (lenders filed 3.8 million foreclosures in 2010, which
was 23% increase compared to 2008 according to Realtytrac). Those who were not in
foreclosure often were delinquent on their mortgage payments, as the number of house-
holds missing at least one payment went up to 5 million by 2009.8 There were fears the
recession would become as deep and painful as the Great Depression.
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) allows me to take a detailed look at house-
hold finances during the Great Recession. The SCF is a triennial survey conducted by
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) which records a vast range of information about the
financial health of households. The SCF interviews around 5,000 households in detail
about their incomes, , assets, debt, pension along with demographic variables such as
education, race, family status. The survey firsts creates a geographically based random
sample with an eye on coverage of important population characteristics. The second step
involves creating an additional sample to include wealthy households, who are harder to
reach and hold disproportionately large shares of certain assets such as businesses and
bonds. Unlike some of the other datasets that have been used to study household liq-
uidity, the SCF is based on structured sampling of households, with appropriate survey
weights designed during the sampling procedure. This makes it a more representative
sample of all Americans compared to personal finance website data, which have larger
self selection issues (skewed towards younger, more educated and single consumers).
On the flipside, the SCF has a smaller sample size and is undertaken every few years





While most versions of the SCF do not follow the same households, the SCF 2007-09
is unique in its panel design. As up to date information was key during the recession,
the FRB ran a follow-up survey of participants in the 2007 SCF, hence creating a panel
dataset. The first version of the 2007-09 SCF was conducted first in 4Q 2007. The second
part of the survey took place between July and December 2009. This unique timing
provides us with a window into the financial conditions of households while the Great
Recession was strengthening. Between early 4Q 2007 and July 2009, S&P500 index fell by
40.3% and fell by 27.92% between early 4Q 2007 and December 2009. Between the two
surveys, a multitude of events occurred, including the passage of the Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008, the sale of Bear Sterns to by JP Morgan, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
and the start and strengthening of the deepest recession in decades.
With any panel survey, it is important to check nonresponse and other potential
biases. Bricker et al. (2011) show the response rates for the 2009 survey was around 87%
of the 2007 sample. In addition, there was no large difference between respondents and
nonrespondents showed in important characteristics, minimizing fears of nonresponse
bias.
I restrict the SCF sample in two ways; by taking out families where the head is not
between 22 and 79 years of age and families where all income originates from self-
employment. The final sample for analysis after these restrictions is a balanced panel on
2,921 households.
3.3 Empirical Method and Findings
In order to understand the evolution of household finances during the Great Recession,
I first define income, liquid and illiquid wealth in the data.
Asset Measurement: I measure assets in the SCF similar to Kaplan et al. (2014).
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Liquid assets are the sum of cash, checking, savings, money market, call account, mutual
fund, stocks, corporate and government bond holdings. Cash holdings are not available
in the SCF, and are imputed based on the median cash to checking account ratio data
from the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice in 2010. I subtract credit card balances
to get net liquid wealth. Illiquid assets are measured as the sum of retirement accounts,
insurance policy cash values, longer term bonds and housing asset prices. I subtract
mortgage debt to measure net illiquid wealth.
Income Measurement: I include both labor income and government transfers. In-
come is defined as gross wages and salaries, self employment income, child support
and alimony, unemployment benefits, food stamps, and Social Security Income (SSI).
Investment income is not included. All values are reported before taxes.
Descriptive Statistics: Table 3.1 summarizes the various asset and incomes of the
sample in both 2007 and 2009 surveys. The median household held around $2,900
in cash, checking and savings account in both years, while holding no stocks, bonds
and credit card debt. The median net illiquid wealth was around $95,000 in 2007 and
dropped to $79,500 in 2009. Housing wealth dominated for the median household, as
they held only around $10,000 in non-housing illiquid wealth. Median incomes were
around $45,000 in 2007 and $49,000 in 2009.
Hand to Mouth Status A survey with data on liquid wealth balances at the end of
every pay period would be ideal in measuring hand to mouth status. Such hand to
mouth households (HTM) include two groups; households who hold zero net liquid
wealth (mit) at the end of each pay period, mit = 0 and households who are at their
credit card limit (mit) at the end of each pay period mit ≤ 0, mit ≤ −mit. 9
The SCF however measures average balances (m¯it) through the period. This intro-
duces some measurement error. I use the criterion used by Kaplan et al. (2014) and
perform two cutoffs. In the first, households can be hand to mouth if their average
9 The households who are at their credit card limit are a small minority of the sample (around 2-3%).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Median Levels of Assets, Liabilities and Income
2007 2009
Cash, Checking and Savings 2919.755 2924.462
Directly held stocks and bonds 0 0
Credit Card Debt 0 0
Net Illiquid Wealth 95369.8 79522.88
Net Non-Housing Illiquid Wealth 9223.388 10162.08
Retirement Account Wealth 0 73.44412
Income 44800 48600
liquid wealth balance is greater than zero, and is less than half their earnings per pay
period. This cutoff proxies for households who have zero liquid assets at the end of the
pay period.
m¯it ≥ 0, m¯it ≤ yit/2
The second cutoff includes households with negative net liquid wealth which is
smaller than the half their earnings per pay period minus their credit limit. This is
proxying for households who are at their credit limit at the end of each pay period. 10
m¯it ≤ 0, m¯it ≤ yit/2−mit
Finally, I assume in my benchmark analysis that most households are paid bi-weekly.
This follows data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey which shows around 50% of
individuals get paid on a bi-weekly basis.
10These are conservative definitions, as households may consume resources faster than at a constant
rate.
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Using this method, I define poor hand to mouth households (PHTM) as households
with zero net illiquid wealth who meet the cutoff for HTM status as described above.
Similarly, wealthy hand to mouth households (WHTM) are households with positive
illiquid wealth who meet the cutoff for HTM status.11 Finally non hand to mouth
households (NHTM) have positive net illiquid wealth and have net liquid wealth bal-
ances above the cutoffs.
Table 3.2 summarizes the relative characteristics of the three groups as discussed in
Kaplan et al. (2014). WHTM households have a larger median income than the PHTM
but lower than the NHTM households. They are slightly older compared to PHTM
households, but younger than NHTM households. They also have intermediate levels of
normal income, defined as income the household would expect to receive in a "normal"
year.
Table 3.2: Characteristics by hand to mouth status
NHTM WHTM PHTM
Income 52000 37000 18000
Normal Income 61769 42599 24494
Age 49 44 40
Education 14 12 12
3.3.1 Hand to Mouth Trends
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of constrained groups in the SCF sample between 2007
and 2009. Overall proportion of WHTM or PHTM households did not change between
11Households with negative illiquid wealth are also considered to PHTM. These are households who
are underwater on their mortgages. They are only 0.4% of the sample in 2007 and 2.9% of the sample in
2009.
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2007 and 2009. The baseline proportion of WHTM households was 14.1% in 2007 and
13.4% in 2009. Similarly, the baseline proportion of PHTM households was 10.8% in
2007 and 10.7% in 2009.
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In order to understand whether this result is specific to the definition of hand to
mouth status, I define both WHTM and PHTM status in alternative ways. Table 3.3
shows the finding is robust to various definitions. Using a stricter definition of both liq-
uid and illiquid asset cutoffs changes the proportion of WHTM and PHTM households,
but does not affect the finding that the proportions do not change over the period. As
there are some costs to liquidating directly held mutual funds, stocks and bonds, another
measure includes them as illiquid assets. This raises the proportion of WHTM house-
holds and lowers the proportion of PHTM households, but the trends remain the same.
Some households use financial equity in vehicles for consumption smoothing purposes.
Hence, I also use a definition of illiquid assets which includes vehicle wealth and get the
same result. Since retirement accounts are more liquid for retired households12, I use an
alternative definition where retirement account values are included in liquid assets for
12Households in retirement do not need to pay taxes when pulling cash out of their retirement accounts.
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those above sixty years. Next, I do not include households with large credit card debt
in the measure of hand to mouth status to check if the trends are dominated by such
households. I find that the trends remain even after discarding such households. Finally,
I also include two other measures of hand to mouth status, defining financially fragile
households as households with up to 2,000 dollars in liquid assets and defining house-
holds with up to 2 months of income in liquid assets as hand to mouth households. The
results remain the same in these cases as well.
Table 3.3: Robustness of HTM household proportions
WHTM PHTM
2007 2009 2007 2009
Baseline 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11
Higher Illiquid Asset Thresholds a 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13
Higher Illiquid Asset Thresholds b 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.14
Stricter Liquid Asset Categories c 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11
Vehicles in Illiquid Assets d 0.21 0.20 0.04 0.04
Retirement Accounts for Older Households e 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11
Credit Card Users not included f 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13
Financially Fragile Households g 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.15
Broad Liquidity Status h 0.39 0.39 0.14 0.16
a Illiquid assets threshold is set at 3,000 dollars.
b Illiquid assets threshold is set at 6,000 dollars.
c Liquid assets do not include directly held mutual funds, stocks and bonds.
d Vehicle values are now included in illiquid assets.
e Retirement accounts for respondents over 60 years is included in liquid assets.
f People with credit card balances over 1,000 dollars are not included in the calculations.
g These include households with upto 2,000 dollars in liquid assets.
h These include households with upto 2 months of income in liquid assets.
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These findings however mask tremendous instability of these groups within them.
The panel element of the SCF data allows me to follow each household and analyze
transitions between groups in the two year period. There are large movements between
the WHTM and NHTM groups between 2007 and 2009. Table 3.4 shows the WHTM
status is very transitory and half of the group become NHTM (7.32%) and a similar
number of households join WHTM from NHTM (6.89%) between 4Q 2007 and later half
of 2009. In contrast, the PHTM status is more stable, as a majority of PHTM households
in 2007 remain in the same status in 2009.
Table 3.4: Percentage of Households in each category in 2007 (row) and 2009 (column)
Status NHTM PHTM WHTM
NHTM 65.51 2.66 6.89
PHTM 3.13 6.35 1.37
WHTM 7.32 1.65 5.12
These two findings hold true when assets and hand to mouth cutoffs are defined in
different ways. Table 3.5 shows the % of households switching from WHTM into NHTM
and vice versa with the different definitions. In all the cases, half of WHTM households
turn into NHTM and a similar proportion of NHTM households turn into WHTM. Even
when using the broadest definition of illiquid households, I find that around 13% of
the sample gains enough liquidity buffers and a similar percentage loses its liquidity
buffers.
These results show that the WHTM status is quite transitory, while the PHTM status
is more persistent. They also point towards a significant role for circumstance in how
households become wealthy hand to mouth during deep recessions. If the character-
istics view solely determined liquidity status, wealthy hand to mouth status ought to
be more persistent. However, the transitory behavior of WHTM households suggests
circumstantial factors such as losses to income, housing wealth are key in driving deci-
sions on liquidity. Why and how do households change their liquidity status? I turn to
this question next by focusing on two groups; households who build liquidity buffers
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Table 3.5: Robustness of HTM household transitions
WHTM into NHTM NHTM into WHTM
Baseline 7.3 6.9
Higher Illiquid Asset Thresholds a 6.3 6.2
Higher Illiquid Asset Thresholds b 6.1 5.8
Stricter Liquid Asset Categories c 8.1 7.3
Vehicles in Illiquid Assets d 9.6 8.5
Retirement Accounts for Older Households e 6.9 6.6
Credit Card Users not included f 5.5 5.7
Financially Fragile Households g 10.9 8.4
Broad Liquidity Status h 13.1 13.2
a Illiquid assets threshold is set at 3,000 dollars.
b Illiquid assets threshold is set at 6,000 dollars.
c Liquid assets do not include directly held mutual funds, stocks and bonds.
d Vehicle values are now included in illiquid assets.
e Retirement accounts for respondents over 60 years is included in liquid assets.
f People with credit card balances over 1,000 dollars are not included in the calculations.
g These include households with upto 2,000 dollars in liquid assets.
h These include households with upto 2 months of income in liquid assets.
between 2007 and 2009 (turn from WHTM to NHTM) and households who lose liquidity
buffers between 2007 and 2009 (turn from NHTM to WHTM).
3.3.2 Households building liquidity buffers
The first group turn from WHTM to NHTM status by building liquidity buffers they did
not have in 2007. The median household in this group increases liquid asset holdings
by 1200 dollars, while households in the 75th percentile increase liquid asset holdings
by 5000 dollars.13 Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows a majority of this happens through
13There is a minority in this group that are characterized as NHTM in 2009 because their credit limits
rose significantly while they lost liquidity. That subgroup is not included in this analysis.
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increases in the checking accounts, although there is a substantial increase in the savings
accounts as well. 14
3.3.2.1 Why?
Households may work hard to build liquidity buffers for a few reasons. First, they might
have been hit by transitory income shocks, which may have depleted their liquid asset
buffers, and they may have been building liquidity buffers as a result. They may also
have personality characteristics which may lead them to shift to NHTM. Finally, they
may have learnt something about their wealth or permanent income. I quantitatively
analyze how each of these factors affects the probability of a WHTM household switch-
ing to NHTM between the survey periods. I use the difference in income between 2007
and 2009 as the measure of short term income changes. In addition, the survey includes
a question on "normal" income for the households, which has been used previously as a
proxy for permanent income (see Kennickell and Lusardi (2004)). I use this variable to
generate the difference in permanent income expectations for each household between
2007 and 2009. 15 Finally, I also utilize the changes in housing price values as the wealth
shock. Following Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), I run regressions accounting for both
multiple imputations and sampling variance issues. 16 Table 3.6 shows the results of
regressions where the dummy variable for switching to NHTM status is regressed on all
of these factors, as well as socio-economic and demographic variables. Columns 1 and 2
use the linear probability model, while Columns 3 and 4 use a probit regression model.
14Data limitations on cash holdings however make it impossible to ascertain if these increases are
accompanied by increase in cash holdings as well.
15 As expected, around 50% of the group has negative changes to permanent income, as the recession
gained strength between 2007 and 2009.
16 In order to deal with missing values, FRB creates a set of sample replicates using bootstrap techniques
and computes analysis weights independently for each replicate. I use the Stata command scfcombo which
handles both issues.
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Table 3.6: Regressions for 2007 WHTM Households
(1 - LPM ) (2 - LPM ) (3 - Probit) (4 - Probit)
% ∆ Income 0.07∗* 0.06∗ 0.20∗ 0.19
(0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12)
% ∆ Normal Income 0.11∗** 0.10∗* 0.31∗* 0.30∗*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.15)
log Normal Income 0.20∗** 0.16∗** 0.54∗** 0.46∗**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14)
% ∆ Housing Value −0.11∗* −0.11∗** −0.29∗* −0.31∗*





Age in 2007 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Education in 2007 0.02∗ 0.07
(0.01) (0.04)
Constant −1.55∗** −1.60∗** −5.60∗** −5.90∗**
(0.51) (0.42) (1.56) (1.26)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results are qualitatively consistent for both the linear probability models and pro-
bit regressions. Decreases in income are associated with a lower probability of building
liquidity buffers, as are decreases in permanent income. On the other hand, loss of hous-
ing wealth is positively correlated to the probability of building liquidity buffers in this
period. While other controls such as age are mostly insignificant, being African Amer-
ican is associated with a significantly lower probability of building liquidity buffers.
Finally, having higher education levels is also associated with a higher probability of
switching under some regression specifications.
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Results from the regression are mostly consistent with buffer stock models of con-
sumption, which specify a target wealth to permanent income ratio. In the canonical
buffer stock consumption model, (see Carroll (2000)), the ratio of consumption C to per-
manent labor income P is a concave function of the ratio of current resources X (defined







where c(x) is an increasing, concave function. Here, if the actual wealth to permanent
income ratio is below the target ratio, then precautionary savings motives push house-
holds to save to get back to the target ratio. However, if the ratio is above the target,
households dis-save. In this framework, a fall in permanent income expectations leads
to a rise in the actual wealth to permanent income ratio compared to the target, which
makes it likely that the households dis-save. This matches the result from the regres-
sions. On the other hand, if illiquid wealth is lost through valuation effects, the need
to acquire liquid wealth to meet the target wealth to permanent income ratio becomes
more important. 17
In addition, larger permanent income in 2007 and higher education levels are also
associated with a higher probability of building liquidity buffers during the recession.
Overall, these results show that while there is some room for characteristics, the predic-
tions of traditional circumstance based buffer stock theories are important. Significant
parts of the population built buffer stock liquid wealth during the Great Recession. They
were more prone to doing so when they had lost wealth in their houses, but did not have
a large drop in normal income expectations. An interesting unanswered question is; how
did these households build up their liquid asset buffers?
17This assumes liquid and illiquid wealth is treated similarly when it comes to consumption smoothing
plans. This assumption is generally true apart from the fact that households face transaction costs when
attempting to use illiquid wealth for consumption smoothing purposes.
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3.3.2.2 How?
There have been previous explanations for how households in deep recessions may build
liquidity buffers. Kaplan and Violante (2014) argue that in a deep recession, households
with illiquid assets find it worth the transaction costs to pull their money out of such
assets. A substantial proportion of households leave WHTM status and join NHTM
status in this process. In the panel SCF data, households who left WHTM status by
building liquidity buffers did have lower illiquid wealth balances in 2009. The median
change in illiquid wealth in this group was a fall of $4,100 while the 75th percentile had a
fall of $45,000. At first glance, it is plausible that this fall in illiquid wealth was caused by
households liquefying their illiquid wealth. In such a scenario, while the illiquid wealth
drops, the liquid wealth levels rebound, as in the data. However, I show that this is
not a major driver of the liquidity status transitions in this period. The households who
gained liquidity buffers did not do so by actively withdrawing from their illiquid wealth.
Instead, the large majority of their balance sheet changes were valuation losses on their
illiquid assets. I show this in two ways. First, I analyze the cumulative changes for each
component of the net illiquid wealth account across all households in the subsample and
show the changes were dominated by the valuation effects on housing. Second, I focus
on cross-sectional data and argue that for a large majority of the group, housing wealth
was the dominant wealth, and the households did not extract housing wealth between
the two surveys. Both methods use the following decomposition of the changes in the
NIW (net illiquid wealth) account into its various components (Equation 3.1).
∆NIW =∆Housing Value− ∆Mortgage Value+ ∆Retirement Account
+ ∆Savings Bonds+ ∆CDs+ ∆Insurance Cash Value
(3.1)
Cumulative Analysis
In Figure 3.2, I add up changes in each part of the NIW account across the subsam-
ple that changes its status from WHTM to NHTM between 2007 and 2009. This mea-
sure allows me to analyze contributions of various components for the whole group.
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∆Housing Value accounts for 70% of the changes in the NIW account for the overall
group. The next largest contributors are changes in mortgage values and retirement
accounts.
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Housing Values: Housing values contribute the largest share of the fall in the net
illiquid asset accounts by far, accounting for 70% of total changes in the NIW. While
changes in housing values can come both from valuation changes and illiquid asset
withdrawals (coming from house sales), I find that the withdrawals only contribute
4.5% of ∆Housing Value and 3.3% of the total fall in NIW. I separate changes in housing
values into withdrawals and valuation effects by utilizing questions regarding residence
changes. The SCF includes variables which denote whether people switched houses, and
the reasons behind the decision. Only 3.3% of the group move away from their principal
residences between 2007 and 2009 due to cost or income pressures. As a conservative
estimate, I assume that all residence changes are due to economic pressures. Even then,
only 13.3% of the group change their principal residences between the two surveys. In
addition, the total contribution of such moves on ∆Housing Value is 4.5%. More than
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95% of ∆Housing Value is coming from the valuation change rather than from active
sale decisions by households.
Mortgage Values: Traditional methods of withdrawing money from the housing
asset include cash out refinancing, borrowing on existing HELOCs, undertaking new
HELOCs, and taking out a second mortgage. All of these raise housing liability and
do not affect the level of the housing asset. Only around 1% of the fall in the NIW
account comes from an increase in the mortgage value in the SCF data. This includes
the payment of mortgage balance which is hidden in the SCF data. For a 30 year fixed
rate mortgage (which I consider an average mortgage), the amortization schedule is 30
years as well. The homeowner pays back all of it in 30 years, which means a homeowner
would pay back around 6.6% of the mortgage in two years, the period between the two
SCF panel surveys. This would mean that naturally, the mortgage size should have gone
down by around 6.6%. Figure 3.2 adds this to the increase in mortgage values seen in
the data, the sum of which accounts for 1% of the total change in the NIW account.
Retirement Accounts: another large contributor to the change in NIW is through the
retirement account (∆Retirement Account). Around 25% of the fall in NIW is explained
by retirement account differences. Again, the value of the retirement account could have
gone down because a) the money was invested in the stock market, where fall in stock
market prices led to a fall in the value of the retirement account or b) the households
actively withdrew their money out of their 401k and IRA accounts. As the SCF does not
include data on actual withdrawals, it is difficult to distinguish between the two causes.
As a back-of-the-envelope analysis, I add up the retirement account levels for the group
in 2007 and 2009 and find that the total retirement account balance dropped by 20% in
the two year period. Considering the stock market dropped by more than 27% in this
same period 18, I argue a majority of this change came from the fall in the stock market
rather than from withdrawals.
18Between early 4Q 2007 and July 2009, S&P500 index fell by 40.3% and fell by 27.92% between early
4Q 2007 and December 2009.
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Others: ∆Savings Bonds,∆CDs,∆Insurance Cash Value are very small in proportion
to ∆NIW. Both changes in savings bonds and life insurance values are responsible
for less than a percentage of the changes in the NIW balances. Changes in CDs are
responsible for around 6% of the changes in the NIW balances. A large reason for this
is that most WHTM households do not hold much savings bonds, CDs and insurance
cash values (median WHTM households have 0 in these accounts in 2007). 19
Cross-Sectional Analysis: WHTM households who built liquidity buffers between
2007 and 2009 owned very little in non-housing illiquid assets in 2007, as shown in
figure 3.3. The median household in this group owned less than $3,500 in non-housing
illiquid assets in 2007. In contrast, the median household owned around $32,000 in
housing equity at the same time. Figure C.2 shows non-housing illiquid wealth was
all concentrated in retirement accounts, as these households did not own CDs, savings
bonds, or life insurance equity.
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For these households, most changes in the illiquid accounts between 2007 and 2009
19 Table .15 in the appendix compares median values of various variables in 2007 between the group
that switches to NHTM and finds they are richer, and have more more housing wealth in 2007.
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came from valuation effects on the house, not adjustment of illiquid assets. There are
four ways of accessing illiquid housing wealth; selling, cash out refinances, second mort-
gages and home equity lines of credit (HELOC). Selling for income pressure reasons was
very rare in this period, as 3.3% of the group moved away from their principal residences
between 2007 and 2009 due to cost or income pressures. Cash out refinances are reflected
in increases in the mortgage value for households who own the same houses as in 2007.
I find that the median household does not increase housing debt at all in this period.
Only around ten percent of the group have increases in mortgage above 20,000 dollars,
which suggests very limited usage of cash out refinancing. 20 As for second mortgages,
the proportion of households who take a second mortgage to get home equity in the
house is only 2.23% of the group. Finally, the proportion of households who take a
new HELOC loan (did not have HELOCs in 2007 but had HELOCs in 2009) is 3.86% of
the group. For households with existing HELOCs, households between 10th percentile
to the 90th percentile had no change in HELOC usage, which suggests HELOC usage
between 2007 and 2009 only increased for a very small subsample of the group. This pro-
vides further evidence to the assertion that traditional methods of withdrawing money
from the housing asset were not significant reason for changes in NIW. On the other
hand, the median household lost around $9,000 in home values. Figure 3.4 shows the
change in home prices was heavily skewed negative for the whole group, as household
in the 75th percentile of losses lost $43,000 in housing wealth. 21
I perform robustness checks by analyzing the proportion of the group for whom
∆NIW is dominated by ∆Housing Value. 66% of the group with a fall in NIW show a
fall in ∆Housing Value. For 54% of the group, fall in housing asset value contributes to
more than half of the fall in the NIW.
20This is after adjusting for imputed principal payments between the two survey periods. Bhutta and
Keys (2016) show households take out a median of $23,000 in housing equity every time they cash out
refinance on their mortgage.
21 This analysis does not include households who change residence between 2007 and 2009.
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All of these facts reinforce the idea that a) for the households who switched from
WHTM to NHTM status between 2007 and 2009 a majority of the contribution in the
fall of NIW came from fall in house prices, b) traditional methods of pulling liquidity
from the house operate through raising mortgage size and this did not contribute to a
majority of changes in the NIW accounts.22 The mechanism where WHTM households
ignore the fixed costs of illiquid assets and actively withdraw wealth from their illiquid
accounts in a deeper recession does not appear to be important in the SCF data.
This leaves consumption as the only margin of adjustment for such households. If
there are no withdrawals from illiquid asset accounts, then changes to liquid assets have
to come from consumption. I calculate the lower bound of this consumption change for
households who did not change residences, and did not engage in cash-out refinancing,
or taking a second mortgage or using HELOCs. I find the median household cut cumu-
lative consumption over the period by around $1,100 while the lowest 10th percentile
cut consumption by $ 16,000.
22These results are supported by regression tables .16 and .17 in the appendix, where I regress the
changes in various illiquid and liquid accounts on whether a household that is WHTM in 2007 changed
its status to NHTM in 2009 or not. I control for log of labor income, age and education.
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3.3.3 Households losing liquidity buffers
6.89% of the households in the sample change status from NHTM to WHTM status
between 2007 and 2009. The median in this group lost $1,300 in liquid assets, and the
75th percentile lost $5,600. C.5 demonstrates a majority of such losses were in checking
accounts, while households lost some liquidity from savings accounts as well. As in the
case of households building liquidity buffers, households may lose liquidity buffers as
a temporary reaction to income losses. Large losses to permanent income expectations
can also cause households to keep lower cash in hand. I regress wealthy hand to mouth
status in 2009 on all of these factors, and Regression 3.7 shows the results. Columns 1
and 2 show results of the linear probability model regressions while Columns 3 and 4
show results of probit regressions.
Circumstantial factors connected to income, such as % change in incomes between
2007-09 and changes to normal income expectations are not significant predictors of
households’ HTM status in 2009. However, the level of normal income in 2007 is strongly
and negatively correlated to the probability of switching into WHTM status. Older and
higher educated households are also much less likely to lose their liquidity buffers in
2009. The only circumstantial variable significant in the regressions is the % change in
housing values. These results suggest the households who switched to WHTM status
were different already in 2007 to the group which did not, and they lost more in housing
value as well.
I further explore whether there were some inherent differences between the two
groups (NHTM households that stayed as NHTM vs. those that changed to WHTM
status by 2009). I analyze their distributions for various important variables in 2007,
including income, age, education, illiquid wealth size, house values, mortgage balance,
leverage ratio for the house, liquid account wealth, credit card debt, net liquid wealth
and net liquid wealth to income ratio. Table 7 shows the difference between the median
levels for the two groups.
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Table 3.7: Regressions for 2007 NHTM Households
(1 - LPM ) (2 - LPM ) (3 - Probit) (4 - Probit)
% ∆ Income 0.006 0.006 0.039 0.036
(0.011) (0.012) (0.069) (0.072)
% ∆ Normal Income 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.017
(0.020) (0.019) (0.106) (0.107)
log Normal Income −0.051∗** −0.046∗** −0.356∗** −0.350∗**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.050) (0.067)
% ∆ Housing Value −0.050∗** −0.048∗** −0.424∗** −0.380∗**





Age in 2007 −0.002∗** −0.013∗**
(0.001) (0.004)
Education in 2007 −0.009∗** −0.047∗**
(0.003) (0.018)
Constant 0.662∗** 0.825∗** 2.546∗** 3.789∗**
(0.087) (0.117) (0.553) (0.837)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The group that stays NHTM is richer, and has a higher normal income. It also has
higher illiquid wealth in 2007 and higher values for its housing assets and liabilities.
The starkest difference between the two groups however comes from the median liquid
wealth in 2007, 23 thousand for the group that stays in NHTM status against 1,200 for the
group that changes its status. Below, I compare the liquid wealth to income ratio. Figure
3.5 shows the distribution of the two groups’ liquid wealth to income ratios. Group 1 is
distributed around a much lower liquidity to income ratio in 2007. In 2009, these are the
same households that become WHTM. In essence, I find that the group that changes to
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Table 3.8: Differences between Group that stayed as NHTM and changed to WHTM
NHTMtoWHTM NHTMtoNHTM
∆ Labor Income 3,000 3,000
Labor Income 2007 39,900 68,050
Normal Income 2007 51,119 91,588
Liquid Wealth 2007 1,192 23,301
Illiquid Wealth 2007 67,202 289,753
Housing Value 2007 103,302 278,546
Housing Liability 2007 41,505 55,340
Housing Leverage 2007 48 25
Liquidity to Income 2007 4 30
Age 2007 44 52
Education 2007 12 16
WHTM has (i) more negative changes in house prices, (ii) was poorer and held low total
wealth, but (ii) was already holding low liquid wealth compared to its wealth.
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These results put an emphasis on characteristics based factors as determinants of fu-
ture liquidity status. The largest predictors of a switch in liquidity status are character-
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istics from 2007 (such as income, education and age), rather than income circumstances
that changed between 2007-09. The only change in circumstance which predicts switch-
ing is loss to housing wealth.23 Again, the importance of including valuation effects on
the illiquid asset is highlighted.
3.4 Conclusion
Hand to mouth status has been espoused as an important variable in understanding
the overall impact of fiscal and monetary policies during recessions. In this chapter, I
have analyzed the trends in liquidity (and hand to mouth) status for households in the
Great Recession period using the panel Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In doing
so, I document three findings. First, the overall proportion of wealthy hand to mouth
households stayed constant in the United States between 2007-09. Second, the wealthy
hand to mouth status was very transitory, as half of the group transitioned into non
hand to mouth during this period. For households building liquidity buffers, losses
to permanent income and housing wealth were important variables which predicted
liquidity management behavior. Third, such movement was primarily achieved through
methods other than the extraction of illiquid assets. This implies households who build
liquidity buffers during recessions do so through cutting consumption sharply. Finally,
for households who lost liquidity buffers, characteristics in 2009 such as income, age,
education are stronger predictors of behavior than changes to income circumstances,
with one exception being change in housing values.
Taken together, these findings imply that both circumstantial and characteristics
views on household liquidity are important when analyzing deep recessions with hous-
ing crises. In the case of circumstantial models, separation between assets and liabilities
23 These results are supported by regression tables .18 and .19 in the appendix, where I regress the
changes in various illiquid and liquid accounts on whether a household that is NHTM in 2007 changed
its status to WHTM in 2009 or not. I control for log of labor income, age and education again.
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is necessary, as valuation changes in home values and subsequent tightening of borrow-
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As the NCP dataset only includes spending on goods with barcodes, coverage is fo-
cused on grocery, drugstore, mass merchandise goods. Healthcare spending and apparel
spending is not included. I am interested in MPC out of nondurable spending in gen-
eral, but the dataset only covers around 35% of total nondurable spending as measured
by the Consumption Expenditure Survey of 2008.
One simple way to scale from MPC out of NCP spending to MPC out of nondurables
spending is to assume that the elasticity of spending across goods is the same. I do this
by multiplying the MPC in the results by 2.8. There are reasons why the MPC out of NCP
spending may be higher or lower than the MPC out of total nondurables. While some
categories of goods and services not included in the NCP such as healthcare generally
have lower MPC out of transitory income, the NCP dataset caters more to spending on
necessary goods, which have lower MPC than the average consumption basket. I argue
there is no systematic bias after netting these effects out.
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A.2 Nonmonotonicity Results
As I highlighted in Chapter 1, the nonmonotonic correlation between MPC and %
changes in local house price values comes primarily from households without liquid
assets. Figure A.1 shows the results for illiquid households with 95% confidence bands.
The nonmonotonic pattern is significant, as households in zipcodes that have housing
price declines of over 30% have a large and significant MPC (over 30% MPC).
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In order to understand why only illiquid households have nonmonotonic MPC, I
utilitize a question in the dataset that asks households about their spending plans from
the rebate.1 I separate the group that plans to deleverage in the regressions against other
groups of illiquid households and liquid households. Figure A.2 shows the nonmono-
tonic result is driven by illiquid households who claim to use the rebate for deleverag-
ing. For these households, the MPC in the areas with largest house price declines is
1 Households can answer they are using the rebates to pay down debt, spend, save or do not know.
Respondents who plan to use the rebates to pay down debt are considered deleveragers.
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very strongly positive (over four times as much as the sample average) and significant
at 95% significance level. Such deleveragers first comprise around 65% of the illiquid
households group, hence the nonmonotonicity for the full group.
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On the other hand, Figure A.3 shows illiquid households who are not planning to
deleverage (including saving, spending and those not sure) show pattern similar to liq-
uid households.
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A.3 Detailed Empirical Results
Figure A.4 shows the histogram of the housing price changes in zipcodes between 2005
and 2008.
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Figure A.5 shows the second month MPC by tercile.
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Figure A.6 shows the spending responses in the polynomial model for the second
month.
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Figure A.7 shows the spending responses in the polynomial model for the first two
months.
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Figure A.8 shows MPC along with confidence bands for liquid households in Month
1.








−.35 −.3 −.25 −.2 −.15 −.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15
% Housing Price Change
105
Figure A.9 shows MPC along with confidence bands for illiquid households in Month
1.
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Figure A.10 shows mean weighted MPC when proportion of liquid households is
calculated in two different ways.
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Figure A.11 shows MPC for richer and poorer housholds.
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Figure A.12 shows MPC for younger and older housholds.
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Figure A.13 shows the results for the winsorized data.










−.35 −.3 −.25 −.2 −.15 −.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15
% Housing Price Change
110
Figure A.14 shows MPC for each decile.
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Figure A.15 shows the correlation between changes in unemployment rates and
housing prices.
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Figure A.16 shows the correlation of housing price changes in 2002-05 with changes
in 2005-08.
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Figure A.17 shows the geographical distribution of housing price changes.













Table A.1: Sample Balance
Deciles Income HH Size Age Liquidity Black Hispanic Spending Work
1 59 2.8 50 60 8 20 155 25
2 59 2.6 51 61 9 21 155 29
3 60 2.5 50 61 9 8 148 22
4 63 2.7 50 63 10 14 155 24
5 60 2.6 50 62 19 13 149 21
6 60 2.7 49 61 13 12 150 22
7 56 2.6 49 56 14 6 150 24
8 52 2.5 49 54 13 6 145 21
9 56 2.6 49 56 14 9 147 24
10 53 2.7 49 61 13 18 154 24
Total 57.9 2.6 50 60 12 13 151 24
Notes: Income denotes mean household income in 2006. HH size denotes the mean size of the household. Age is
the maximum of the age of the male and female heads of the households. Liquidity is the percentage of households
answering Yes to the liquidity question in the survey. Black and Hispanic denote the percentage of those groups in the
subsamples. Spending denotes the average weekly spending in the subsamples. Finally, Work denotes the proportion
of households where the male head of the family is not working. There is no data in NCP to denote unemployment
directly. Finally, all results are weighted by the NCP projection factor weights.
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Table A.2: Sample Balance (Extended)
Deciles Mail Reb. Receipt Male Education Female Education
1 49 22.3 57.4 55.5
2 48 22.3 59.0 61.0
3 49 22.2 58.8 55.9
4 51 22.2 53.3 56.5
5 50 22.2 55.6 54.8
6 54 21.7 57.4 56.2
7 52 22.0 55.3 54.4
8 51 22.1 49.8 51.8
9 54 21.9 58.6 51.7
10 56 21.8 54.8 53.0
Total 51 22.1 56.0 55.2
Notes: Mail denotes the percentage of households who received their rebates in mail. Reb. Receipt denotes the mean
week of the year when households received the rebate. Male and Female Education denote the percentage of male
and female heads of households who had finished college or had more education.
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Table A.3: Baseline Regressions (Full Sample and Terciles 1-3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3
Rebt 13.6*** 5.4 17.7*** 21.7***
(2.5) (4.5) (4.3) (4.4)
Rebt−1 11.8*** 5.3 18.3*** 17.4***
(2.4) (4.2) (4.3) (4.5)
Rebt−2 3.9* -3.8 5.7 8.3**
(2.3) (4.1) (4.4) (3.9)
Rebt−3 4.1* 0.2 8.9** 3.9
(2.5) (4.4) (4.5) (4.2)
Rebt−4 1.7 -2.6 7.2 2.6
(2.5) (4.8) (4.5) (4.2)
Rebt−5 0.8 -9.0* 8.8* 4.2
(2.7) (4.7) (5.0) (4.6)
Rebt−6 -1.3 -8.0 2.4 1.7
(2.8)* (5.0) (4.9) (4.8)
Rebt−7 -1.9 -10.0** 6.6 1.5
(2.9) (5.1) (5.4) (5.0)
Cum. Reb. (Month 1) 33.43** 7.088 50.60** 51.29**
Cum. Reb. (Month 2) -0.78 -29.59 24.99 9.973
N 889,616 281,476 281,632 281,216
Notes: Dependent variable is spending. Time and Household Fixed Effects are included. The Reb variable is an indi-
cator of rebate receipt. Standard errors clustered at household-level in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates significance at
99%/95%/90%-level respectively. All sample statistics are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Calculated
based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data Center at the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business.
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Table A.4: Polynomial Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Variable ×∆ H Variable ×∆H2 Variable ×∆H3
Rebt 17.89*** 53.74* -97.95 -444.6
(3.14) (27.54) (121.1) (314.9)
Rebt−1 14.56*** 44.79 36.23 -87.8
(3.08) (27.79) (141.1) (345.7)
Rebt−2 3.54 44.04* 65.3 -117.1
(2.89) (25.83) (120.9) (305.7)
Rebt−3 4.84 42.53 -1.54 -356.4
(3.16) (27.55) (153.42) (366.7)
Rebt−4 2.19 14.90 36.78 -11.94
(3.12) (28.92) (140.26) (373.1)
Rebt−5 0.98 60.70** 125.98 -126.31
(3.67) (30.58) (227.2) (529.4)
Rebt−6 -3.07 38.2 189.5 122.9
(3.5) (30.68) (157.3) (379.4)
Rebt−7 1.51 38.12 -56.49 -204.8
(3.76) (32.29) (186.5) (437.1)
Notes: Dependent variable is spending. Time and Household Fixed Effects are included. The Reb variable is an
indicator of rebate receipt. Standard errors clustered at zipcode-level in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates significance at
99%/95%/90%-level respectively. All sample statistics are weighted by the NCP projection factor for 2008. Calculated
based on data from The Nielsen Company (US) LLC and provided by the Marketing Data Center at the University of




This appendix derives the formula characterizing optimal targeted transfer policy de-
scribed in the main text.
Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, .... The economy consists of I equally sized local regions
within a currency union.




1)− v(ni1) + βiVi2(xi2)
where ci1 denotes date 1 consumption, n
i
1 hours worked, and x
i
2 real net worth at date
2. We do not make any particular assumption about the individual’s problem at date
2, except that it can be summarized by some continuous, increasing, concave expected
value function Vi2(x), which is independent of the policies discussed in this section.















where ciH,1 denotes i’s consumption of the locally produced good, and c
i
j,1 denotes i’s
consumption of the good produced in region j. The parameter α indexes the degree of




















≤W i1ni1 + P1xi1 + P2Ti
and the borrowing constraint
xi2 ≥ −φi
where Pj,1 denotes the date 1 price of the good produced in region j, 1 + i1 denotes the
gross nominal rate of return on the risk free bond traded by households, W i1 denotes
the nominal wage in region i, and Ti denotes the net real transfer from the federal
government to households in region i.
Nominal wages are sticky at date 1 with W i1 = W for all i. As a result, agents are not
necessarily on their labor supply curves: W0P0 6=
v′(ni0)
u′(ci0)
. We assume that hours are equally
rationed, ni0 = n
j
0 := n0, ∀i, j.




Given a nominal wage W, perfect competition implies that Pi1 =
W
A , for all i.
Government. We consider a scenario in which monetary policy is constrained by the
zero lower bound at date 1 (i1 = 0), and the monetary authority targets zero inflation at
date 2 (P2 = P1). The fiscal authority collects a uniform lump sum tax T¯ > 0 from each
region at date 1, and distributes these resources in the form of nonnegative, targeted





Equilibrium. Given a fiscal policy {Ti}Ii=1, an equilibrium is a collection
{ciH,1, {cij,1}Ij=1, ni1, xi2, yi1, Pi1}Ii=1 such that households and firms maximize, there is equal
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rationing ni1 = n
j




Optimal policy. We consider the problem of a fiscal policymaker who assigns Pareto





In order to describe the solution to this problem, it is first useful to characterize equilib-
rium. It is straightforward to see that individual i’s optimization problem yields a value
function Vi1(n1, T
i) which depends on hours worked and public transfers, and a con-
sumption function ci1 = C
i(w1ni1 + T
i− T¯) which depends on total income w1ni1 + Ti− T¯,
where w1 = WP1 denotes the real wage (which, under our assumption, is independent of
fiscal policy). Since perfect competition yields constant prices across regions, spending









into the market clearing condition and using the fact that PiP =
w1















s.t. αCi(w1ni1 + T







j − T¯) = w1ni1, i = 1, ..., I (B.2)
∑
i
Ti = IT¯ (B.3)
Ti ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., I (B.4)
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− µ ≤ 0 (B.6)
where ψj and µ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (B.2) and
(B.3), respectively. If Ti > 0 at an optimum, (B.6) holds with strict equality. We can
rearrange (B.5) as
ψi = − λ
i[










































∂Ti w1 − 1
This in turn allows us to solve for ψi:
ψi = − λ
i[




























ψj = −α λ
i[





















∂Tk w1 − 1
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Define the MPC mi := ∂C
i
∂Ti ; the social marginal utility of individual i, relative to the
shadow cost of funds for the government gi := λ
iu′(ci1)






















which holds with strict equality for all regions receiving positive transfers.
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B.2 Buffer Stock Model Details
A 2-period version of the canonical buffer stock model is
max ln c1 +E ln c2
s.t. c2 = Ra + y
c1 + a = x
where y is stochastic. Here x should be interpreted as date 1 income plus liquid wealth.
We can interpret a fall in house prices in two ways - as a decrease in x (if houses are
perfectly liquid) or as a decrease in the mean of y (if houses cannot be sold today but
will be sold tomorrow.
It is a standard result that c1 is an increasing, concave function of x. The proof here
is a special case of the one given in Carroll and Kimball. We have the Euler equation
u′(c1) = REu′(Ra + y) = φ′(x− c1)
where we define u(c) = ln c, φ(s) = E ln(Rs + y). Since u′′ < 0, u′′′ > 0, we likewise






= 2. We need to show that





 R3u′′′(Rs + y) √2φ′′(Rs + y)√
2φ′′(Rs + y) φ′(Rs + y)
 := EB
so we need to show that A is positive semidefinite. For all realizations of y2, the matrix
B has determinant R4(u′′′u′ − 2(u′′)2) = 0 and thus is positive semidefinite. Because
the weighted sum of positive semidefinite matrices is positive semidefinite, A is positive
semidefinite.
We now differentiate the Euler equation with respect to x.











Differentiating a second time:























Since the term in square brackets is nonnegative and the term multiplying it is negative,
overall we have cxx ≤ 0. The consumption function is concave, and the MPC is positive
and (weakly) decreasing in initial wealth.
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B.3 Toy Model with Default
Households initially have a mortgage which implies certain mortgage payments, and a
house which they plan to sell in the second period. They can default in the first period,
in which case they are forced to rent, are excluded from credit markets, and don’t get
to sell their house in the second period. The size of a house is normalized to h > 1 for
owners and 1 for renters. To simplify, let’s first consider the case in which there is no
liquid asset. The value of not defaulting is
Vr(x, p) = ln c1 + ln h + ln(c2)
s.t. c1 = x−m
1+ p
where x denotes first period income, second period income is normalized to 1, m is
the date 1 mortgage payment, and p is the house price at date 2 net of any remaining
mortgage. The value of defaulting is
Vd(x, p) = ln c1 + ln 1+ ln(c2)
s.t. c1 = x
c2 = 1
Here we normalize rental payments to zero. So x should really be interpreted as wealth
net of today’s rental payment, and m should be interpreted as the difference between
the mortgage payment and rent (assumed to be positive).
Thus a household will default if
Vd(x, p) > Vr(x, p)
ln x + ln 1 > ln(x−m) + ln h + ln(1+ p)
p <
x
h(x−m) − 1 := p
∗
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This defines a decreasing relationship between p∗ and x. Alternatively, the highest level




a decreasing function. In other words, households default either when they have a low
house price or a low income.
Consumption is given by
c1 = c(x, p) =

x if x < xd(p)
x−m if x ≥ xd(p)
For an individual with given cash on hand y1 and expected house price p, we can ask
how that individual would change consumption given a rebate check of size z. Abusing
terminology, we can define MPC(p) :=
c1(x + z, p)− c1(x, p)
z




1 if p <
1










1 if p >
1
h(1−m/x) − 1
In words, the MPC is 1 if house prices are so low that the consumer is going to default
with or without the rebate, or so high that the consumer never defaults with or without
the rebate. It is 1− m
z
- which is negative whenever the mortgage payment is larger than
the rebate - if house prices are in an intermediate range, where the household would
default without the stimulus check, but would repay with the check.
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B.4 Model Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Example of a Life Cycle
Age
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Notes: Default rates in the model are the percentage of all households who default in the period. We use percentage
of mortgages that are more than three months delinquent at the 4th quarter of 2008 as the data analog.











Table B.1: Asset Holdings of US Households based on 2007 SCF
Bottom 80% Top 20% All Households
Median Labor Income 35,000 122,000 43,000
Median Liquid Assets 1,161 27,386 2,121
Median Illiquid Assets 50,000 349,000 84,000
Housing Value 170,000 400,000 210,000
Mortgage Size 50,000 172,000 74,000
Housing Equity 31,000 203,000 52,000
Liquid Wealth
5th Percentile 0 0 0
10th Percentile 0 0 0
25th Percentile 0 5,718 0
Median 1,161 27,386 2,121
LTV for Homeowners
Median 0.31 0.42 0.35
75th Percentile 0.65 0.66 0.65
90th Percentile 0.86 0.81 0.84
95th Percentile 0.94 0.90 0.93
Notes: Data is from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). All liquid asset values are set to zero if they are
negative.
Table B.2: Moments Not Used in Calibration
Homeowners Renters
Data Model Data Model
A. Liquid Wealth A. Liquid Wealth
10th percentile 0 350 0 0
25th percentile 265 700 0 1,000
50th percentile 5,050 3,280 210 6,010




75th Percentile 0.65 0.72
90th Percentile 0.86 0.86
95th Percentile 0.94 0.95
Notes: Data is from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). All liquid asset values are set to zero if they are
negative. Model values are only for non-retirees.
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Appendix C
Figure C.1: Changes in Checking and Savings Accounts Balances for WHTM switchers
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Figure C.3: Comparisons between Groups that stay as WHTM vs. change status to NHTM
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Table C.1: Differences between Group that stayed as WHTM and changed to NHTM
WHTMtoNHTM WHTMtoWHTM
∆ Labor Income 2,000 500
Labor Income 2007 46,000 32,000
Normal Income 2007 53,249 34,079
Liquid Wealth 2007 195 49
Illiquid Wealth 2007 55,340 29,515
Housing Value 2007 105,147 47,962
Housing Liability 2007 31,360 5,534
Housing Leverage 2007 42 33
Liquidity to Income 2007 1 0
Age 2007 45 45
Education 2007 12 12
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Figure C.4: Net Illiquid Wealth in 2007 NHTM Households
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Table C.2: Regressions for 2007 WHTM Households
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Net Liquid ∆ Net Illiquid ∆ Illiquid Assets
WHTM Status 09 -4557.5∗∗∗ 21687.7∗∗∗ 18628.5∗∗∗
(-392.81) (374.50) (306.67)
Age in 2007 2.532 -617.6∗∗∗ -880.1∗∗∗
(0.98) (-340.68) (-484.47)
Education in 2007 36.05∗∗∗ 827.0∗∗∗ 562.9∗∗∗
(10.82) (68.47) (45.06)
Log of Labor Income 1425.1∗∗∗ -13486.9∗∗∗ -12865.6∗∗∗
(17.20) (-315.94) (-304.15)
Constant -10660.4∗∗∗ 133184.5∗∗∗ 143723.9∗∗∗
(-10.60) (245.98) (271.41)
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.035 0.036
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.3: Regressions for 2007 WHTM Households
(1) (2)
∆ Housing Asset ∆ Housing Liability
WHTM Status 09 12916.6∗∗∗ -3059.2∗∗∗
(274.14) (-120.06)
Age in 2007 -597.1∗∗∗ -262.4∗∗∗
(-414.11) (-348.54)
Education in 2007 942.5∗∗∗ -264.1∗∗∗
(88.75) (-52.10)




Adjusted R2 0.033 0.009
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.4: Regressions for 2007 NHTM Households
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Net Liquid ∆ Net Illiquid ∆ Illiquid Assets
NHTM Status 09 -2634.2∗∗∗ 6557.8∗∗∗ 14333.7∗∗∗
(-29.57) (114.85) (207.39)
Log of Labor Income -10452.3∗∗∗ -34685.9∗∗∗ -37002.2∗∗∗
(-21.41) (-276.35) (-289.97)
Age in 2007 -1319.9∗∗∗ -1609.1∗∗∗ -1779.0∗∗∗
(-137.69) (-359.60) (-387.48)
Education in 2007 -3031.9∗∗∗ -6600.4∗∗∗ -3250.5∗∗∗
(-60.52) (-268.02) (-120.01)
Constant 209382.1∗∗∗ 498355.4∗∗∗ 481165.6∗∗∗
(40.64) (360.25) (342.21)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.009 0.008
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.5: Regressions for 2007 NHTM Households
(1) (2)
∆ Housing Asset ∆ Housing Liability
NHTM Status 09 7613.9∗∗∗ 7775.9∗∗∗
(133.57) (224.12)
Log of Labor Income -23491.2∗∗∗ -2316.3∗∗∗
(-256.16) (-90.67)
Age in 2007 -1232.4∗∗∗ -169.9∗∗∗
(-346.24) (-162.73)




Adjusted R2 0.005 0.006
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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